Deportation for a Sin: Why Moral Turpitude Is Void for Vagueness by Holper, Mary P
Nebraska Law Review 
Volume 90 Issue 3 Article 3 
2012 
Deportation for a Sin: Why Moral Turpitude Is Void for Vagueness 
Mary P. Holper 
Roger Williams University School of Law, MHolper@rwu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr 
Recommended Citation 
Mary P. Holper, Deportation for a Sin: Why Moral Turpitude Is Void for Vagueness, 90 Neb. L. Rev. (2013) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol90/iss3/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of 
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
Mary Holper*
Deportation for a Sin: Why Moral
Turpitude Is Void for Vagueness
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 648
II. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 649
A. Legislative History of CIMT in Deportation Law . . . 649
B. CIMT Defined by the Courts and BIA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 653
C. Padilla v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 658
III. Jordan v. De George . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 662
IV. Challenging CIMT as Void for Vagueness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 663
A. Scope of the Vagueness Challenge to CIMT . . . . . . . . 664
1. Facial v. As-Applied Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 664
2. Challenging CIMT in the Deportation v.
Exclusion Statute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 665
3. Strictness of the Vagueness Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 670
B. Fair Notice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 672
1. Deportation for a Sin? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 678
2. Failing to Draw Meaning from CIMT in Other
Areas of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 687
3. Supreme Court Vagueness Challenges to Similar
Statutes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 690
C. Balancing Necessity Against Vagueness . . . . . . . . . . . . 697
V. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 701
Manuel, a lawful permanent resident from El Salvador, is charged with the
Virginia offense of being a passenger and leaving the scene of an accident
where there was bodily injury.  His public defender, wanting to help Manuel
avoid deportation, consults a chart, written by a local immigration attorney,
which lists the immigration consequences of various Virginia offenses.  Happy
to see that this offense does not render Manuel deportable for an “aggravated
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felony,” or many other grounds of deportation, she reads that the offense “possi-
bly” renders him deportable for a “crime involving moral turpitude.”
I. INTRODUCTION
Manuel’s fairly typical story is governed by two important Su-
preme Court cases.  In the 1951 case of Jordan v. De George,1 the Su-
preme Court decided that a statute authorizing deportation for a
“crime involving moral turpitude” (CIMT) was not void for vagueness
because courts had long held the noncitizen’s offense, fraud, to be a
CIMT, so he was on notice of his likely deportation.  This case left
noncitizens like Manuel and their criminal defense attorneys wonder-
ing: if the crime charged was not one that courts had held to be a
CIMT, would deportation result?  Then, the Court held in the 2010
case Padilla v. Kentucky,2 that defense counsel has a Sixth Amend-
ment duty to warn noncitizens only about immigration consequences
that are “succinct, clear, and explicit” from a reading of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act.3  Because the meaning of CIMT is not “suc-
cinct, clear, and explicit” in the statute, attorneys like Manuel’s
criminal defense lawyer have no clear obligation to read case law and
warn him about deportability for a CIMT.  Thus, the lawyer best situ-
ated to give noncitizens like Manuel notice of the meaning of CIMT,
thanks to the vagueness of the term CIMT with respect to many of-
fenses, cannot ascertain whether a client’s conviction will be a CIMT;
thanks to Padilla, she may not even be required to figure it out.
In this Article, I argue that courts should find the term CIMT in
deportation law is void for vagueness, notwithstanding the Jordan de-
cision.  Courts are bound by Jordan with respect to the “easy” cases
such as fraud.4  However, for the world of offenses with no clear case
law deciding whether they are CIMTs, the term is vague.  Because the
definition of CIMT used by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
and courts is an act that is “base, vile, or depraved” and “contrary to
the accepted rules of morality,”5 it provides no useful definition.
Rather, this ground for deportation casts judges in the role of God,6
1. 341 U.S. 223 (1951).
2. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
3. See id. at 1483.
4. See Jordan, 341 U.S. at 232 (reasoning that while there may be peripheral cases
where the meaning of CIMT is in doubt, “[t]here is no such doubt present in this
case” because “[t]he phrase ‘crime involving moral turpitude’ has without excep-
tion been construed to embrace fraudulent conduct”).
5. Mehboob v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 272, 275 (3d Cir. 2008); In re Danesh, 19 I. & N.
Dec. 669, 670 (B.I.A. 1989).
6. See Jordan, 341 U.S. at 236–37 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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assessing whether the offense offends the “moral standards generally
prevailing in the United States.”7
In Part II, I give the background leading up to a situation like Ma-
nuel’s.  I discuss some legislative history of the term CIMT and how it
presently is defined by the courts and BIA.  I also discuss the Supreme
Court’s recent holding in Padilla, which left defense counsel repre-
senting noncitizens with no clear obligation to read case law and de-
termine whether a given offense will lead to deportation for a CIMT.
In Part III, I discuss the Supreme Court’s holding in Jordan that the
term CIMT is not void for vagueness in a deportation statute.  In Part
IV, I argue that courts should find the term CIMT is void for vague-
ness in an as-applied challenge to an offense that is not an “easy” case
such as fraud.  I discuss examples in which the BIA and courts have
sat in judgment of whether certain offenses are CIMTs by applying
the “moral standards generally prevailing in the United States”8 to
demonstrate how the term CIMT allows judges to apply their own per-
sonal opinions of morality.  I also discuss several Supreme Court
cases, decided both before and after Jordan, which determined
whether statutes were void for vagueness and apply this reasoning to
the statute authorizing deportation for a CIMT.  Finally, I argue that
a vague term like CIMT is not necessary in deportation law because
Congress has found ways to fulfill its legislative goal of deporting un-
desirable noncitizens through clearer terms.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Legislative History of CIMT in Deportation Law
An 1891 Act introduced the term CIMT into federal immigration
law, excluding from the United States “persons who have been con-
victed of a felony or other infamous crime or misdemeanor involving
moral turpitude.”9  The term was adopted “without comment in the
accompanying reports.”10  However, it appears the term may have
7. See 22 C.F.R. § 40.21(a)(1) (2011); In re McNaughton, 16 I. & N. Dec. 569, 573
(B.I.A. 1978).
8. 22 C.F.R. §40.21(a)(1).
9. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084.  The act excepted persons convicted
of political offenses, “notwithstanding said political offense may be designated as
a ‘felony, crime, infamous crime, or misdemeanor, involving moral turpitude’ by
the law of the land whence he came or by the court convicting.” Id.   For an
excellent discussion of the history of exclusion and deportation for crimes, see
DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY
(2007).
10. Brian C. Harms, Redefining “Crimes of Moral Turpitude”: A Proposal to Congress,
15 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 259, 262 (2001) (quoting STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 100TH CONG., GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION OF ALIENS UNDER THE IMMI-
GRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 102
(Comm. Print 1988) [hereinafter HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS].
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been a response to joint congressional hearings in 1891, which recom-
mended immigration laws to “separate the desirable from the undesir-
able immigrants, and to permit only those to land on our shores who
have certain physical and moral qualities.”11  Acts of 1903 and 1907
included similar language, excluding noncitizens for, among other rea-
sons, CIMTs.12
While CIMT remained a ground of exclusion, the 1917 Act was the
first time that CIMT also became a ground of deportation.13  The 1917
Act authorized deportation for commission of a CIMT within five years
after entry for which a sentence of one year or more was imposed; also
deportable was someone who committed two CIMTs at any time after
entry.14  Professor Daniel Kanstroom wrote about public opinion lead-
ing up to the 1917 Act, stating, “The idea of deportation for more types
of post-entry crime easily garnered public support,”15 as “there was
clearly a general perception at the time of widespread and increasing
crime.”16  A commission created to study immigration policy in 1911
recommended “a five-year period of deportability of aliens convicted of
serious crimes after entry.”17  The legislative history indicates that no
11. KANSTROOM, supra note 9, at 115 (quoting SPECIAL COMM. ON IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION, 51ST CONG., 2D SESS., REP. (II) (1891) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
12. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 2, 34 Stat. 898, 898–99; Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch.
1012, § 2, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214.
13. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, §§ 3, 19, Stat. 874, 875, 889–90 (repealed 1952); KAN-
STROOM, supra note 9, at 133–34.  In Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S.
581 (1889), the Court upheld the federal government’s plenary power to exclude
foreigners, which was incident to sovereignty.  In Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U.S. 698 (1893), the Court reasoned that the power to exclude included the
power to deport; thus, the federal government’s deportation laws also were sub-
ject to the plenary power: “The right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners . . .
rests upon the same grounds and is as absolute and unqualified as the right to
prohibit and prevent their entrance into the country.” Id. at 707.  Professor Kan-
stroom wrote about the evolution of the grounds of exclusion and deportation.
See KANSTROOM, supra note 9, at ch. 3.  Early on, the laws did not deport persons
for post-entry conduct; rather, persons were deportable for pre-entry conduct. Id.
at 125.  However, eventually, Congress created “post-entry social control deporta-
tion laws,” which involved ideological and criminal deportations; this was in re-
sponse to the early federal “war on crime.” Id. (citing E. P. HUTCHISON,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 1798–1965, 101 (Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Press 1981)).
14. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, §§ 19, 39 Stat. 874, at 889.
15. KANSTROOM, supra note 9, at 133.
16. Id.
17. Id. (quoting U.S. IMMIGRATION COMM’N , REPORT 1:45–48 (1911)); see also 6
CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 71.05 (rev. ed.
2010) (citing S. REP. NO. 64-352 (1916)) (“Deportation for criminal activities in
the United States first appeared in the Immigration Act of 1917 in response to a
public outcry against the activities of noncitizen criminals.”).
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one sought to define the term CIMT;18 rather, it appears that Con-
gress deemed CIMT to be the equivalent of a “serious offense.”19
The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which com-
pletely revised the immigration laws,20 contained the same CIMT pro-
visions of the 1917 act, rendering a noncitizen inadmissible for a
CIMT and deportable for two CIMTs, or a single CIMT committed
within five years of admission if a sentence of one year or longer was
imposed.21  The 1952 act was passed in another fearful, pro-deporta-
tion era; one of the coauthors of the act stated that “thousands of
criminals and subversive aliens are roaming our streets, a continuing
threat to the safety of our people.”22  Even those who opposed the act
were “thoroughly in favor of deporting and excluding undesirable
aliens.”23  The legislative history of the 1952 Act indicates some immi-
gration inspectors and consular officers objected that the term CIMT
as used in the exclusion statute was “too broad” and that “a listing of
crimes and circumstances comprehended within the meaning of moral
turpitude” would be helpful, because “the applicability of the exclud-
ing provisions often depends on what the individual officer considers
to be baseness, vileness, or depravity.”24  However, a Senate report
responding to these criticisms explained, “Although it might be desira-
ble to have the crimes specifically set forth, difficulties might be en-
countered in getting a phrase that would be broad enough to cover the
various crimes contemplated with the law and yet easier to compre-
hend than the present phrase.”25
In 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA);26 AEDPA and its counterpart, the Illegal Immi-
18. Homosexuality As Grounds For Exclusion, 3 Op. O.L.C. 457, 460, note 4 (1979)
(citing S. REP. NO. 64-352 (1916)) (stating that two provisions of the 1917 act,
exclusion for intended acts of “immoral purpose” and deportation for CIMTs
“were left wholly undefined by the 1917 Act and by its legislative history”); see
also id. (“The terms are also not explained in the legislative history of H.R. 6060,
63d Cong., 3d sess. (1916), in which the deportation category first appeared, or in
the legislative history of the Act of February 20, 1907, 34 Stat. 898, 899, in which
the exclusionary provision originated.”).
19. See S. REP. NO. 64-352, at 15 (1916) (discussing House version of the bill that
contained a provision “for the deportation of aliens who commit serious crimes
within five years after entry” and for “aliens to be deported without limitation on
the length of time after entry when they commit a second serious offense.”).
20. See S. REP. NO. 82-1137, at 1 (1952).
21. Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163, 182, 204 (1952).
22. KANSTROOM, supra note 9, at 174 (quoting Laurent B. Frantz, Deportation Deliri-
ums: Xenophobia in Action, The Nation, (Mar. 26, 1955), at 258 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
23. Id. (quoting 98 CONG. REC. 5239 (1952) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
24. S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 353 (1950).
25. Id.
26. See Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22,
28, 40, and 42 U.S.C.).
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gration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),27 ex-
panded the criminal grounds of deportability, particularly the
“aggravated felony” category,28 and enhanced the consequences of
conviction for an aggravated felony.29  IIRIRA also rendered deport-
able persons convicted of crimes of domestic violence, stalking, and
child abuse, and those who had violated restraining orders.30  The
1996 laws, adopted during the fearful time following the 1995
Oklahoma City bombings,31 were a response to a belief that many
noncitizens had committed crimes and thus needed to be deported in
order to protect the safety of the American people.32  AEDPA largely
left the 1952 CIMT language intact yet made deportable a noncitizen
27. Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in scattered sections of 8
and 18 U.S.C.).
28. See § 440(e), 110 Stat. at 1277.  The term “aggravated felony” was introduced by
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.  Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181.  Origi-
nally, the term included only murder, drug trafficking, and weapons trafficking.
Id. § 7342, 102 Stat. at 4469–70.  The Immigration Act of 1990 expanded the defi-
nition of aggravated felony, as did the Immigration and Nationality Technical
Corrections Act of 1994, AEDPA in 1996 and IIRIRA in 1997. See § 321(a), 110
Stat. at 3009-627 to 628; 440(e), 110 Stat. at 1277; Pub. L. No. 103-416, § 222(a),
108 Stat. 4305, 4320–21; Pub. L. 101-649, § 501(a)(3), 104 Stat. 4978, 5048; see
also Terry Coonan, Dolphins Caught in Congressional Fishnets—Immigration
Law’s New Aggravated Felons, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 589, 592–605 (1998) (describ-
ing evolution of aggravated felony definition).  Today, the term includes twenty-
one categories of offenses. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)–(U) (2006).
29. For example, the long-term waiver of deportation previously available to long-
term permanent residents under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
§ 212(c) was eliminated. See Pub. L. 414-477, § 212(c), 66 Stat. 163, 187 (1952)
(repealed by § 304(b), 110 Stat. at 3009–597).  At the same time, the replacement
waiver, now called cancellation of removal, barred those convicted of an aggra-
vated felony from seeking the relief. See § 304(a)(3), 110 Stat. at 3009-587 to 597,
8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (Supp. IV 1998) (enacting cancellation of removal procedures).
30. § 350(a), 110 Stat. at 3009-639 to 640.
31. See Coonan, supra note 28, at 600 (quoting Text of the President’s Statement on
Antiterrorism Bill Signing, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Apr. 24, 1996, available at 1996 WL
5620927) (“Enacted in the wake of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, AEDPA
reflected both popular and legislative determination to deter and punish terror-
ism.  Notwithstanding President Clinton’s acknowledgment that the bill ‘made a
number of major, ill-advised changes in our immigration laws having nothing to
do with fighting terrorism,’ he signed the bill into law on April 24, 1996.” (foot-
note omitted)).
32. See Rep. Lamar Smith & Edward R. Grant, Immigration Reform: Seeking The
Right Reasons, 28 ST. MARY’S L. J. 883, 929–30 (1997) (arguing that “[i]n the
early 1980s, approximately 1,000 inmates in federal prison facilities were
foreign-born, a share of four percent,” whereas “[c]urrently, there are more than
24,000 sentenced, non-citizen inmates in federal prisons, out of a total foreign
born population exceeding 34,000” (footnotes omitted)); see also David A. Martin,
Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The Real Meaning
of Zadvydas v Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 62–63 (2001) (“Cracking down on
illegal immigration featured as a prominent theme in the election year of 1996,
and a seeming competition erupted in Congress to see who could be toughest on
criminal aliens.”).
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convicted for one CIMT committed within five years of admission only
if the possible sentence was one year or more.33
B. CIMT Defined by the Courts and BIA
CIMT has no statutory definition;34 thus, Congress has delegated
power to define it to a few agencies and courts.35  For noncitizens in
removal proceedings, decisions made by the Executive Office for Immi-
gration Review (EOIR) and federal courts govern whether a particular
offense is a CIMT.36  The decision is made by an immigration judge in
the first instance; on appeal, the issue is decided by the Board of Im-
migration Appeals, a fourteen-member body37 that decides appeals of
decisions of immigration judges nation-wide.38  The issue is then de-
cided by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the federal circuit court in
which the immigration judge completed proceedings.39  The U.S. State
33. § 435, 110 Stat. at 1274.  The Immigration Act of 1990, which preceded AEDPA,
also amended the INA, yet retained the same language of the 1952 act regarding
exclusion and deportation for CIMTs.  § 237(a)(2)(A), 66 Stat. at 201, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A), (amended by the Immigration Act of 1990, § 602, 104 Stat. at
5077).
34. Hamdan v. INS, 98 F.3d 183, 185 (5th Cir. 1996).
35. See Cabral v. INS, 15 F.3d 193, 195 (1st Cir. 1994).
36. A noncitizen in removal proceedings may be subject to the grounds of de-
portability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227 or the grounds of inadmissibility at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182, both of which include crimes involving moral turpitude.  8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2006) (rendering inadmissible noncitizen who has been con-
victed of or admitted to the essential elements of a CIMT); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (proscribing removal for conviction for one CIMT committed
within five years of admission if the crime is punishable by at least a one-year
sentence); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (removal for two CIMT convictions, not
arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct, committed at any time
after admission).  A noncitizen may be subject to both the grounds of de-
portability and inadmissibility if, for example, he is deportable, yet seeks adjust-
ment of status to lawful permanent residence as a defense to deportation.  In this
discussion of the agency case law on CIMTs, many of the BIA decisions were
decided in the context of inadmissibility, yet they apply equally to deportability.
37. The BIA is authorized to have up to fifteen members, although there are cur-
rently fourteen permanent and five temporary Board members. 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(a)(1) (2011); EOIR Fact Sheet: Board of Immigration Appeals Biographi-
cal Information, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/fs/biabios.htm
(last updated Jan. 2012).
38. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b).  The BIA is not necessarily the final arbiter of agency
matters, as the Attorney General may vacate an immigration judge’s or BIA
panel’s decision and certify an issue to him- or herself. See id. § 1003.1(h)(i).
39. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2).  Circuit courts are required to give deference to an agency
interpretation of its own statutory term, provided that the meaning of the term is
ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. See Chevron, U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).  Even if the
agency changes its interpretation of a statutory term, circuit courts should defer
to the agency’s new interpretation, provided that the statute is ambiguous and
the new interpretation is reasonable. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v.
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005).
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Department defines CIMT in the Foreign Affairs Manual,40 which
guides officers deciding who should be admitted from abroad to the
U.S. on immigrant or non-immigrant visas; this definition largely syn-
thesizes BIA and federal case law on the term.41  The Citizenship and
Immigration Services (CIS), whose officers are responsible for decid-
ing which noncitizens should get immigration status such as perma-
nent residence,42 borrows the definitions of CIMT set forth by the BIA
and courts.43  How have the courts and BIA defined CIMT in immigra-
tion law?
Because moral turpitude is undefined in the statute, several BIA
decisions have defined it as “conduct that shocks the public conscience
as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the rules of
morality and the duties owed between man and man, either one’s fel-
low man or society in general.”44  When applying this definition, a few
rules have emerged with respect to the meaning of CIMT.45  For ex-
40. See 9 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 40.21(a), N2.
41. See id. (listing offenses that are CIMTs based on case law).
42. See 6 U.S.C. § 271(b).
43. See generally Patrick T. McDermott, Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude, SHUS-
TERMAN, http://www.shusterman.com/pdf/cmt04.pdf (last updated May 2004)
(listing various CIMT’s and citing cases related to them).
44. In re Danesh, 19 I. & N. Dec. 669, 670 (B.I.A. 1989); In re Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec.
225, 227 (B.I.A. 1980); In re Baker, 15 I. & N. Dec. 50, 51 (B.I.A. 1974).
45. Dating back to when “moral turpitude” first appeared in the immigration laws,
courts have preferred an elements-based analysis to determine whether an of-
fense involves moral turpitude; this approach is commonly called the categorical
approach. See United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl, 210 F. 860, 863 (2d Cir. 1914);
see also Rebecca Sharpless, Toward a True Elements Test: Taylor and the Cate-
gorical Analysis of Crimes in Immigration Law, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979, 979–80
(2008) (stating that immigration adjudicators cannot substitute judgment for
that of a criminal court to determine guilt or innocence).  This analysis requires a
judge to determine the elements of the criminal offense, i.e., the minimum acts
that the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt in order for the jury to
convict; the judge then considers whether this minimum conduct involves moral
turpitude. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970); In re Short, 20 I. & N.
Dec. 136, 137–38 (B.I.A. 1989).  If there are offenses punishable under the statute
that involve moral turpitude and some that do not, the judge consults the record
of conviction to determine the nature of the conviction. See In re Pichardo-
Sufren, 21 I. & N. Dec. 330, 334 (B.I.A. 1996).  If the minimum conduct does not
involve moral turpitude, an adjudicator cannot consider the underlying facts that
led to the conviction. See Mylius, 210 F. at 863.  This elements-based approach
that traditionally existed has been upended by a 2008 Attorney General decision,
which created a new three-part test to determine whether an offense is a CIMT.
See In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 689–704 (Att’y Gen. 2008).  In the
first step, an immigration judge “must determine whether there is a ‘realistic
probability, not a theoretical possibility,’” that the statute under which the nonci-
tizen was convicted reaches “conduct that does not involve moral turpitude.” Id.
at 689–90.  In the second step, if the statute is divisible, judges must use the
traditional categorical approach, looking to the record of conviction to determine
whether the offense involved moral turpitude. Id. at 690.  The third step is where
the Attorney General significantly broke with the traditional elements-based ap-
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ample, crimes in which fraud is an essential element have been held to
be CIMTs.46  Theft offenses, where the statute punishes an offender
for intending to permanently deprive the owner of the rights and ben-
efits of ownership, have consistently been held to be CIMTs.47  Many
sexual offenses have been held to be CIMTs.48  Assault crimes have
been held to involve moral turpitude when the offense has an aggra-
vating factor such as a deadly weapon.49
As indicated by this list of offenses, a key ingredient of many
CIMTs in immigration law is scienter;50 as one court stated, “it is in
the intent that moral turpitude inheres.”51  While courts and the BIA
have not required evil intent, offenses generally must have a mens rea
of at least recklessness to be a CIMT.52  The Seventh Circuit ex-
proach: “When the record of conviction is inconclusive, judges may, to the extent
they deem it necessary and appropriate, consider evidence beyond the formal re-
cord of conviction.” Id.
46. See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 227 (1951).
47. See In re  D-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 143, 144–45 (B.I.A. 1941) (holding that theft with
intent to steal is a CIMT, whereas theft with intent to deprive the owner of his
rights for a temporary period is not a CIMT); see also Tillinghast v. Edmead, 31
F.2d 81, 83 (1st Cir. 1929) (reasoning that either misdemeanor or felony theft is a
CIMT because “theft or larceny was a crime at common law involving an act in-
trinsically and morally wrong and malum in se, and does not acquire additional
turpitude from being declared unlawful by the municipal law”).
48. See, e.g., Mehboob v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d  272, 277–79 (3d. Cir. 2008) (finding
indecent assault is a crime involving moral turpitude); In re Dingena, 11 I. & N.
Dec. 723, 727 (B.I.A. 1966) (finding carnal knowledge of a minor is a CIMT).
49. Compare Yousefi v. INS, 260 F.3d 318 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting assault with a dan-
gerous weapon, e.g., a rock, can be a crime of moral turpitude), with Short, 20 I &
N. Dec. at 139 (stating simple assault is not a CIMT).  In In re Fualaau, the BIA
held that crimes against the person are CIMTs if the statute punishes a mens rea
of at least recklessness plus causation of serious bodily injury.  21 I. & N. Dec.
475, 477–88 (B.I.A. 1996).
50. See In re Sweetser, 22 I. & N. Dec. 709, 712–17 (B.I.A. 1999) (finding conviction
for criminally negligent child abuse is not a CIMT); In re Perez-Contreras, 20 I. &
N. Dec. 615, 619 (B.I.A. 1992) (“Since there was no intent required for conviction,
nor any conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk, we find no
moral turpitude inherent in the statute.” (citing United States ex rel. Mongiovi v.
Karnuth, 30 F.2d 825 (W.D.N.Y. 1929))); In re R-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 772, 774 (B.I.A.
1955) (noting that because knowledge was an essential element of the crime of
receiving stolen goods, the crime involved moral turpitude).
51. United States ex rel. Meyer v. Day, 54 F.2d 336, 337 (2d Cir. 1931); see also
Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 253, 265 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[M]oral turpitude . . . is a ques-
tion of the offender’s evil intent or corruption of the mind.” (quoting In re Serna,
20 I. & N. Dec. 579, 581–82 (B.I.A. 1989))); Id. at 263 (“[C]orrupt scienter is the
touchstone of moral turpitude.” (citing Hamdan v. INS, 98 F.3d 183, 187 (5th Cir.
1996))); In re Ajami 22 I. & N. Dec. 949, 950 (B.I.A. 1999) (“Among the tests to
determine if a crime involves moral turpitude is whether the act is accompanied
by a vicious motive or a corrupt mind.”).
52. See, e.g., Mehboob, 549 F.3d at 276 (stating that “the ‘hallmark’ of moral turpi-
tude has become ‘a reprehensible act with an appreciable level of consciousness or
deliberation.’” (quoting Partyka v. Att’y Gen., 417 F.3d 408, 414 (3d Cir. 2005)));
In re Medina, 15 I. & N. Dec. 611, 614 (B.I.A. 1976) (concluding that moral turpi-
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plained that if a statute includes a mens rea of intentional conduct,
the offense must also be serious—deliberate, minor crimes are not
CIMTs.53  Also, crimes that are serious, yet lack a mens rea (i.e., strict
liability crimes), are not CIMTs.54  In this same vein, courts and the
BIA also have looked to the common law distinction between mala in
se and mala prohibita for a dividing line; it is often stated that only
those offenses mala in se are CIMTs.55
What happens when an offense does not fit within one of the
clearly-defined rules, such as Manuel’s offense of being a passenger in
a hit and run with bodily injury?  In this type of case, the BIA and
courts resort to the “inherently base, vile, or depraved” definition,
which is derived from dictionaries.56  Reference must be made to
“moral standards generally prevailing in the U.S.”57  Under this stan-
dard, the BIA has stated, “the nature of a crime is measured against
contemporary moral standards and may be susceptible to change
based on the prevailing views of society.”58
tude inheres in aggravated assault with a deadly weapon even if one acts not
with intent, but with recklessness, because the “definition of recklessness re-
quires an actual awareness of the risk created by the criminal violator’s action”).
53. See Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737, 740 (7th Cir. 2004).
54. See id.; In re Abreu-Semino, 12 I. & N. Dec. 775 (B.I.A. 1968) (holding that regu-
latory offenses are not CIMTs). But see Castle v. INS, 541 F.2d 1064, 1066 (4th
Cir. 1976) (holding that statutory rape is a CIMT, notwithstanding its lack of
intent element, because the “inherent nature” of the offense “is so basically offen-
sive to American ethics and accepted moral standards as to constitute moral tur-
pitude per se”); In re Dingena, 11 I. & N. Dec. 723, 727 (B.I.A. 1966) (holding that
statutory rape of a child is a CIMT).
55. See, e.g., Serna, 20 I. & N. Dec. 579; In re E-, 2 I. & N. Dec. 134, 141 (B.I.A. 1944).
But see Nicanor-Romero v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The dis-
tinction between malum in se and malum prohibitum is one important indicator,
but not all malum in se crimes categorically involve moral turpitude.” (citation
omitted)); In re Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1188, 1193 (B.I.A. 1999) (“While it is
generally the case that a crime that is ‘malum in se’ involves moral turpitude and
that a ‘malum prohibitum’ offense does not, this categorization is more a general
rule than an absolute standard.”).
56. See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 224, 235 n.7 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(citing BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY 2247 (Rawle, ed., 3d rev. 1892)); In re D-, 1 I. &
N. Dec. 190, 193 (B.I.A. 1942) (quoting 20 AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF LAW 872).
57. 22 C.F.R. § 40.21(a)(1) (2011).  That regulation states that consular officers “must
base a determination that a crime involves moral turpitude upon the moral stan-
dards generally prevailing in the United States.” Id.  While this regulation does
not apply to BIA decisions, the BIA has adopted the “moral standards generally
prevailing in the United States” as the test for moral turpitude. See, e.g., In re
McNaughton, 16 I. & N. Dec. 569, 573 (B.I.A. 1978); In re O’N-, 2 I. & N. Dec. 319,
321 (B.I.A. 1945).
58. In re Torres-Varela, 23 I. & N. Dec. 78, 83 (B.I.A. 2001); see also In re G-, 1 I. & N.
Dec. 59, 60 (B.I.A. 1941) (stating that the standards by which an offense is to be
judged is “that prevailing in the United States as a whole, regarding the common
view of our people concerning its moral character”).
2012] DEPORTATION FOR A SIN 657
Manuel’s public defender has no easy task in this situation.59  No
court has determined whether the offense of being a passenger in a hit
and run situation is a CIMT.  The Fifth and Ninth Circuits, whose
opinions will not be binding on Manuel’s removal proceedings,60 have
reasoned that a conviction under a statute punishing a driver who
fails to render aid to persons injured in an accident is a CIMT.61  Yet
Manuel’s charged offense does not specifically punish the passenger
for failing to render aid, just failing to report the accident.62  Analogiz-
ing the offense to assault, his attorney could determine that the ele-
59. Manuel is represented by court-appointed counsel in this scenario, as he risks jail
time if he is convicted of this offense. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.2-895 (2011)
(describing offense of passenger hit and run), 46.2-900 (classifying offense as a
class six felony where injury results), 18.2-10(f) (noting that punishment for class
six felony is a term of imprisonment of not less than one year nor more than five
years); see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972) (holding that Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in a criminal case extends to all cases in which im-
prisonment may be imposed).  However, there are many noncitizen criminal de-
fendants who remain unrepresented, either because they are charged with an
offense not punishable by imprisonment or because they have waived their rights
to counsel. See id; see also Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298 (1988) (requir-
ing, for a waiver of the right to counsel, that the accused be advised of “the useful-
ness of counsel to the accused at the particular proceeding, and the dangers to the
accused of proceeding without counsel”).
60. Prior to 1996, noncitizens who had been admitted to the United States were in
“deportation” proceedings, whereas those who were stopped attempting to enter
the United States were in “exclusion” proceedings.  The 1996 reforms to the INA
combined these into “removal” proceedings. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 17, at
§ 64.01.  Manuel’s scenario takes place in Virginia; his removal proceedings thus
are likely to be held in the Virginia immigration court, and therefore only Fourth
Circuit case law will be binding on his case. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) (2006).
61. In Garcia-Maldonado v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 284 (5th Cir. 2007), the Fifth Circuit
held that a conviction under a Texas hit-and-run statute, which punished a
driver involved in an accident who fails to stop and render aid, was a CIMT be-
cause the statute “proscrib[ed] behavior that runs contrary to accepted societal
duties.” Id. at 288–90.  In Cerezo v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2008), the
Ninth Circuit considered a conviction under a California hit-and-run statute; the
minimum conduct punishable was for a driver in an accident resulting in injury
to stop and provide identification but fail to provide a vehicle registration num-
ber. Id. at 1167–69.  The court held that this minimum conduct punishable was
not a CIMT; the court reasoned that leaving the scene of an accident, as opposed
to failing to affirmatively report identifying information, was a CIMT. Id. at
1169; see also Latu v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1070, 1073–76 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding
that statute punishing as minimum conduct driver who stops and renders aid but
fails to give requisite information to police is not categorically a CIMT); Orosco v.
Holder, 396 Fed. App’x 50, 52–55 (5th Cir. 2010) (reasoning that statute punish-
ing failure to report an accident where no injury resulted was not a CIMT).
62. Compare VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.2-895, 900 (2010) (punishing passenger with
knowledge of accident where injury or death resulted who fails to report acci-
dent), with § 46.2-894 (punishing driver involved in accident where injury or
death resulted who fails to stop and report accident or fails to render reasonable
assistance to injured persons).
658 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:647
ment of bodily injury might make the offense a CIMT.63  However, it is
not as though the elements require Manuel to have caused the bodily
injury.64  Therefore, assault is not the best analogy.  The offense re-
quires that he willfully leave the scene of the accident.65  Thus, it
would appear that the existence of a mens rea would lead to a conclu-
sion that his offense is a CIMT.  Yet, the existing case law requires
both knowledge and that the act be bad enough to involve moral turpi-
tude.66  Thus, relying on scienter alone does not answer the question
of whether Manuel’s offense is a CIMT.
Manuel’s public defender, confounded by the inability to come up
with a clear answer for whether a plea to this offense will subject her
client to deportation, might try to determine whether she is under any
obligation at all to advise her client about possible deportation.  As it
turns out, the Supreme Court weighed in on this issue in 2010.
C. Padilla v. Kentucky
The Supreme Court, in its 2010 decision Padilla v. Kentucky,67 de-
cided that a criminal defense attorney commits ineffective assistance
of counsel when she fails to notify a client about the immigration con-
sequences of criminal charges, when those consequences “could easily
be determined from reading the removal statute.”68  The Court held
that defense attorneys have an obligation to advise only on the immi-
gration consequences that are “succinct, clear, and explicit” from a
reading of the INA.69  If immigration consequences cannot be clearly
read in the INA, defense counsel has the burden to advise only that
the “pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigra-
tion consequences.”70
The Court did not opine whether CIMT was an immigration conse-
quence that “could easily be determined from reading the removal
statute.”71  However, Justice Alito, in his concurring opinion, cited
CIMT as one example of an immigration consequence that was not
“succinct, clear, and explicit” in the INA.72  He reasoned that the ma-
jority’s opinion did not specify whether defense lawyers were required
only to open up the INA and read about possible immigration conse-
quences, or whether they were obligated to do a “cursory examination
63. See, e.g., In re Faulaau, 21 I. & N. Dec. 475, 477–88 (B.I.A. 1996).
64. See id.
65. See, e.g., In re Ajami, 22 I. & N. Dec. 949, 950 (B.I.A. 1999).
66. See Efagene v. Holder, 642 F.3d 918, 925 (10th Cir. 2011); In re H-, 1 I. & N. Dec.
394, 396 (B.I.A. 1943).
67. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
68. Id. at 1483.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. Id. at 1490 (Alito, J., concurring).
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of case law or administrative decisions [to] provide a definitive
answer.”73
In the wake of Padilla, courts have sought to clarify whether cer-
tain immigration consequences could easily be determined from read-
ing the removal statute.74  In one case, the Court of Appeals of Iowa
determined whether counsel was ineffective for failing to warn that a
conviction for tampering with records would lead to deportation for a
CIMT.75  The court, holding that counsel did not have a duty to warn
specifically about CIMT as an immigration consequence, reasoned,
“determining whether Lopez-Penaloza’s conviction for tampering with
records is a CIMT is not as simple as reading the text of the INA.”76
Since a proper advisal would have required counsel “to step into the
‘labyrinth’ of immigration law,”77 which would have involved review-
ing various decisions by the BIA and federal courts, the court held
that counsel had the “more limited duty of advising her ‘that pending
criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration conse-
quences.’”78  In another case, the District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of New York considered whether counsel was ineffective because
he did not advise his client that he could be deported for a CIMT, since
he was charged with perjury.79  The court reasoned that immigration
case law alone did not provide the requisite clarity about CIMT as an
immigration consequence and therefore it was not ineffective assis-
tance of counsel for defense counsel to have failed to warn about this
as an immigration consequence.80  The court stated, “Although the
link between perjury and moral turpitude appears to have existed in
immigration-related case law for decades . . . this case lacks the level
of statutory clarity that was present in Padilla.  Under these circum-
stances, petitioner’s situation is not so close to that in Padilla . . . .”81
In yet another case, a New York court considered defense counsel’s
failure to warn about deportability for two CIMTs; the court reasoned,
73. Id.
74. See generally Ce´sar Cuauhte´moc Garcia Herna´ndez, When State Courts Meet Pa-
dilla: A Concerted Effort is Needed to Bring State Courts Up to Speed on Crime-
Based Immigration Law Provisions, 12 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 299, 314–28 (review-
ing six months following Padilla decision and finding one state court that en-
gaged in the correct analysis, in which a Texas court found that a defense
attorney could clearly read the deportation consequences of a theft offense,
namely, that it was potentially an aggravated felony, since the definition of ag-
gravated felony is clear).
75. Lopez-Penaloza v. State, 804 N.W.2d 537, 543–46 (Ct. App. Iowa 2011).
76. Id. at 545.
77. Id. (citing Garcia, supra note 74, at 308).
78. Id. at 546 (citing Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483).
79. Bailey v. United States, 10-CV-324A, 96-CR-105A, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88205
(W.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2010).
80. Id. at *7–8.
81. Id.
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“[u]nder these circumstances, where the removal ‘consequences of [de-
fendant’s] . . . plea[s] . . . [were] unclear or uncertain,’ plea counsel was
constitutionally obliged to ‘do no more than advise [defendant] that
pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration
consequences.’”82
Thus, it appears that Manuel’s defense lawyer has no clear obliga-
tion to advise him about whether he is deportable for a CIMT; she
need only advise him that the pending criminal charges may carry a
risk of adverse immigration consequences.83  However, even though
she is not required to advise Manuel about potential deportation for a
CIMT, she is not precluded from advising.  The Supreme Court has
indicated that “competent defense counsel, following the advice of nu-
merous practice guides,” would advise a noncitizen about the immi-
gration consequences of a guilty plea;84 the Court just would not go so
far as to obligate defense counsel to warn about immigration conse-
quences that are not clearly listed in the INA.85  Trying to be that
competent defense counsel, she searches for a guide.  She finds many
quick-reference charts for defense counsel to consult before advising a
noncitizen client to accept a guilty plea.86  Luckily for her, Virginia
has such a chart, written by a local immigration attorney.87
82. People v. Christache, 907 N.Y.S.2d 833, 843 (N.Y. Crim Ct. 2010) (quoting Pa-
dilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483); see also State v. Aguirre, CA2011-03-001, 2012 Ohio
App. LEXIS 100, *12 (Ct. App. Ohio Jan. 17, 2012) (reasoning that for an offense
that fits within one or more of the “broad classification of crimes” covered by the
INA, including CIMT and aggravated felony, counsel need only advise about the
risk of adverse immigration consequences). But see Ex Parte Joel de los Reyes,
350 S.W.3d 723, 731 (Ct. App. Tx. 2011) (reasoning that “given the common un-
derstanding of the term ‘moral turpitude,’ counsel could have easily determined
the consequences of two theft convictions from reading the statute”).
83. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483.
84. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 n.50 (2001).
85. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483.
86. See, e.g., Legal Resources: Criminal and Deportation Defense, NAT’L IMMIGR. PRO-
JECT, http://nationalimmigrationproject.org/legalresources.htm (last visited Jan.
4, 2012) (compiling quick reference charts of the immigration consequences of
offenses in several states, available under the subheading “Information About
Immigration Consequences of Criminal Convictions”).
87. See Mary Holper, Immigration Consequences of Selected Virginia Statutes, NAT’L
IMMIGR. PROJECT (Oct. 2007), http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/
legalresources/cd_so_Chart%20-%20Virginia%20-%202007.pdf.  These quick-ref-
erence charts cannot be updated frequently enough to encompass all of the
changes to immigration law.  For example, the chart consulted by Manuel’s attor-
ney was last updated in 2007. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483.  Hence the diffi-
culty of expecting defense counsel to educate themselves enough, in an area as
complex as immigration law. See id. at 1489–90 (Alito, J., concurring) (reasoning
that “[m]any . . . terms of the INA are . . . ambiguous or may be confusing to
practitioners not versed in the intricacies of immigration law” and “[t]he task of
offering advice about the immigration consequences of a criminal conviction is
further complicated by other problems, including significant variations among
Circuit interpretations of federal immigration statutes; the frequency with which
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The Virginia chart indicates that Manuel’s offense is “possibly” a
CIMT.88  Annotations to the chart indicate that because there is no
case law on point, the author’s best guess is that such an offense may
offend the contemporary morals of the time.89  Thus, Manuel’s fate
will fall into the hands of an Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) officer who places him in removal proceedings,90 an immigra-
tion judge who decides whether the ICE has met its burden of proving
that he is deportable for a CIMT,91 and the BIA92 and circuit courts93
(if Manuel chooses to appeal and either can successfully write the ap-
peal himself, pay an attorney, or find a pro bono attorney).94  At each
level, the decision-maker will decide whether his offense is “base, vile,
or depraved, contrary to the accepted rules of morality”95 based on the
decision-maker’s assessment of the “moral standards generally pre-
vailing in the U.S.”96
Given the elusive nature of the term CIMT, it is unsurprising that
the Supreme Court considered whether the deportation statute was
void for vagueness.
immigration law changes . . . .”); id. at 1490  (“[N]othing is ever simple with immi-
gration law” (quoting R. MCWHIRTER, AM. BAR ASS’N, THE CRIMINAL LAWYER’S
GUIDE TO IMMIGRATION LAW: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS § 4.65, at 130 (2d ed. 2006;
DAN KESSELBRENNER ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND CRIMES § 2.1 (2008))); see
GORDON ET AL., supra note 17, at § 71.05(a)(iii)(A) (discussing case law regarding
CIMT in immigration law but stating, “[i]t should . . . be borne in mind that the
tabulations represent only decided cases, the results of which sometimes may be
altered by changing moral concepts and judicial decrees”).  Thus, busy defense
lawyers would still be required to consult ever-changing BIA and federal case law
on the meaning of CIMT, which the Supreme Court has indicated they are not
obligated to do to provide effective assistance of counsel.
88. See Holper, supra note 87, at 34.  Many of these charts do not provide absolute
certainty to a defense lawyer advising her noncitizens client, as they frequently
use terms such as “possibly” and “probably” when answering the question of
whether certain offenses will render a noncitizen deportable. See, e.g., Dan Kes-
selbrenner & Sandy Lin, Selected Immigration Consequences of Certain Federal
Offenses, NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT, www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/
legalresources/fed_chart_2010%20update.pdf (last updated 2010).
89. See Holper, supra note 87, at 34.
90. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.13, 1003.14(a), 1003.15(c) (2011).
91. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2006) (stating that the burden of proof in the case
of deportable noncitizen is “clear and convincing evidence”).
92. The BIA decides legal issues, such as whether an offense is a CIMT, de novo. See
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii).
93. The circuit courts, on petitions for review, can only decide constitutional ques-
tions or questions of law.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), (D) (2006).  Because the issue
of whether an offense is a CIMT is a question of law, judicial review is likely.
94. Noncitizens in removal proceedings and appeals are not given court-appointed
counsel. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4) (2006).
95. See Mehboob v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 272, 275; In re Danesh, 19 I. & N. Dec. 669,
670 (B.I.A. 1988).
96. 22 C.F.R. § 40.21(a)(1) (2011); In re McNaughton, 16 I. & N. Dec. 569, 573 (B.I.A.
1978).
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III. JORDAN V. DE GEORGE
In 1951, in the case of Jordan v. De George,97 the Supreme Court
decided the case of an Italian noncitizen who had twice been convicted
of conspiracy to defraud the U.S. of taxes on distilled spirits and faced
deportation for two CIMTs.98  Even though neither party had raised
the vagueness issue,99 the Court held the term CIMT was not void for
vagueness.100  To reach this conclusion, the Court relied on the term’s
use in other areas of law.101  For example, the term appeared in legis-
lation governing the disbarment of attorneys and the revocation of
medical licenses; judges also used the term to disqualify and impeach
witnesses, determine the measure of contribution between joint tort-
feasors, and decide whether certain language is slanderous.102  In ad-
dition to the term’s “deep roots” in the law,103 it also had been part of
the immigration laws for more than sixty years.104  Thus the perva-
siveness of the term CIMT gave credence to it, notwithstanding its
uncertain parameters.105
Additionally, the federal and state case law interpreting the term
left no doubt in any noncitizen’s mind that fraud crimes fell into the
category of crimes involving moral turpitude.106  The Court reasoned
that “[i]mpossible standards of specificity are not required;”107 rather,
“[t]he test is whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warn-
ing as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common under-
standing and practices.”108  Because fraud was obviously a CIMT,
there was no need to think about the difficulty of applying the term to
“less obvious cases.”109
Justice Jackson, dissenting, noted two groups baffled by the term
CIMT: Congress and judges.110  Citing the legislative history of the
statute authorizing deportation for a CIMT, Justice Jackson stated,
“Congress knowingly conceived it in confusion . . . clear warnings of its
deficiencies were sounded and never denied.”111  Judges were no more
97. 341 U.S. 223 (1951).
98. Id. at 226.
99. Id. at 229.
100. Id. at 231–32.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 227.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 229.
105. See id. at 229–30.
106. Id. at 227–29.
107. Id. at 231.
108. Id. at 231–32.
109. Id. at 232.
110. Id. at 233–34 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
111. Id. (quoting Hearings before House Committee on Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion on H. R. 10384, 64th Cong. (I) 8, (1915) (statements of Representative
Sabath) (“[Y]ou know that a crime involving moral turpitude has not been de-
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educated about the meaning of the term: “[i]f we go to the dictionaries,
the last resort of the baffled judge, we learn little except that the ex-
pression is redundant, for turpitude alone means moral wickedness or
depravity and moral turpitude seems to mean little more than morally
immoral.”112  Justice Jackson reasoned that the government’s attempt
to define CIMTs as those crimes that are mala in se as opposed to
mala prohibita offered no assistance to explain the term, for “[t]his
classification comes to us from common law, which in its early history
freely blended religious conceptions of sin with legal conceptions of
crime.”113  Justice Jackson also did not accept as a definition “the
moral standards that prevail in contemporary society” as sufficiently
definite, reasoning that “[t]his is a large country and acts that are re-
garded as criminal in some states are lawful in others.”114
Thus, the Court appears to have given the term CIMT in deporta-
tion law its constitutional blessing.115  In a case like Manuel’s, is a
challenge to the term CIMT still feasible?
IV. CHALLENGING CIMT AS VOID FOR VAGUENESS
Despite the Jordan decision, courts and the BIA have admitted
that the term CIMT is not clear.116  The following section explores
fined.  No one can say really what is meant by saying a crime involving moral
turpitude.”)).
112. Id. at 234 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 374 (1st ed. 1849); BOUVIER’S LAW
DICTIONARY 2247 (Rawles, ed. 3d rev. 1892)).
113. Id. at 237.
114. Id. at 237–38.
115. Several courts have decided, without discussion, that Jordan precluded any fu-
ture vagueness challenge to the term CIMT in deportation law. See, e.g., Tseung
Chu v. Cornell, 247 F.2d 929, 938–39 (9th Cir. 1957); United States v. Circella,
216 F.2d 33, 40 (7th Cir. 1954); Ramirez v. INS, 413 F.2d 405, 405 (D.C. Cir.
1969).
116. See, e.g., Garcia-Meza v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 535, 536 (7th Cir. 2008) (describing
the phrase CIMT as “notoriously baffling”); Mei v. Ashcroft 393 F.3d 737, 741
(7th Cir. 2004) (“Time has only confirmed Justice Jackson’s powerful dissent in
the [Jordan] case, in which he called ‘moral turpitude’ an ‘undefined and undefi-
nable standard.’” (quoting Jordan, 341 U.S. at 235 (Jackson, J., dissenting))); De
Leon-Reynoso v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 633, 635 (3d Cir. 2002) (“The term ‘moral
turpitude’ defies a precise definition.”); Tseung Chu, 247 F.2d at 933 (noting that
the “myriad [of] decisions sponsoring various concepts of moral turpitude” has not
offered any “well settled criteria”); In re Tobar-Lobo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 143, 144
(B.I.A. 2007) (“We have observed that the definition of crime involving moral tur-
pitude is nebulous.” (citing In re Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N, Dec. 1188, 1191 (B.I.A.
1999); In re Ajami, 22 I. & N. Dec. 949, 950 (B.I.A. 1999))); see also United States
ex rel. Manzella v. Zimmerman, 71 F. Supp. 534, 537 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (“While the
term ‘moral turpitude’ has been used in the law for centuries it has never been
clearly or certainly defined. This is undoubtedly because it refers, not to legal
standards, but rather to those changing moral standards of conduct which society
has set up for itself through the centuries.”); United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl,
203 F. 152, 154 (3d Cir. 1914) (“ ‘Moral turpitude’ is a vague term.  Its meaning
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why this lack of clarity should lead courts to void the term CIMT in
deportation law in an as-applied challenge involving a statute that
does not fit an easy case such as fraud.
A. Scope of the Vagueness Challenge to CIMT
1. Facial v. As-Applied Challenge
There are two types of vagueness challenges: facial and as-applied.
To facially void a vague law, the statute must prohibit a substantial
amount of conduct that is protected by the First Amendment117 or the
law must “fail[ ] to establish standards for the police and public that
are sufficient to guard against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty in-
terests.”118  In either of these situations, there is a constitutionally-
protected interest at stake, which justifies facial review of the law.119
For challenges that implicate no constitutionally protected conduct,
the Court rejects automatic facial review and determines whether a
law is constitutional as applied to the petitioner.120  In these cases, a
facial vagueness challenge should be upheld “only if the enactment is
impermissibly vague in all of its applications.”121  Thus, as one scholar
depends to some extent upon the state of public morals.”); In re D-, 1 I. & N. Dec.
190, 193 (B.I.A. 1943) (“Moral turpitude is a vague term.  Its meaning depends to
some extent upon the state of public morals.”); Immigration Laws-Offenses In-
volving Moral Turpitude, 37 Op. Att’y Gen. 293, 294 (1933) (“[Moral turpitude] is
a vague term, its meaning depending to some extent upon the state of public
morals . . . .” (quoting 41 C.J. § 212)); HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS,
supra note 10, at 109 (“The term ‘moral turpitude’ as used in the exclusion and
deportation provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act has been the
source of some confusion over the years.”).
117. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 (1999); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 904 (1990) (distinguishing be-
tween the ordinary or non-First Amendment vagueness doctrine and the First
Amendment vagueness doctrine and reasoning that the latter is “best conceptual-
ized as a subpart of First Amendment overbreadth doctrine”).
118. Morales, 527 U.S. at 52; Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 (1983) (holding
that a “stop and identify” statute is “unconstitutionally vague on its face because
it encourages arbitrary enforcement by failing to describe with sufficient particu-
larity what a suspect must do in order to satisfy the statute”).
119. Morales, 527 U.S. at 51; Kolender, 461 U.S. at 361.
120. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975); United States v. Nat’l
Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32 (1963).
121. Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494–95
(1982).  In Hoffman Estates, the Court reasoned that “[i]n reviewing a business
regulation for facial vagueness . . . the principal inquiry is whether the law af-
fords fair warning of what is proscribed.” Id. at 503.  The Court determined that
the business regulation gave sufficient notice to the petition with respect to at
least certain items sold; therefore, the facial challenge was rejected. See id. at
495 (“A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.”).
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stated, “it should be recognized that claims of facial vagueness that
prove successful are the exception rather than the rule.”122
It is very likely that the statute authorizing deportation for a
CIMT would survive a facial challenge.  Because the statute does not
implicate First Amendment or other constitutional rights, a nonci-
tizen raising such a challenge would have to prove that the statute
was vague in all of its applications.123  This would be very difficult in
the clear cases such as theft, fraud, and sexual offenses, because
agency interpretations and federal case law have provided notice that
these statutes will be CIMTs.124  However, there will always be of-
fenses for which there is no case on point.125  Manuel’s case provides
such an example.  This Article thus proposes an as-applied challenge
to CIMT when it does not involve one of the “easy cases” such as
fraud.126
2. Challenging CIMT in the Deportation v. Exclusion Statute
The term CIMT appears in both the exclusion and deportation
statutes, both of which are civil in nature.127  How does this impact
the application of the vagueness doctrine?  Despite the fact that many
of the original vagueness cases involved criminal statutes,128 the
vagueness doctrine has been applied to civil statutes.129  Moreover,
the vagueness doctrine is rooted in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
122. John F. Decker, Addressing Vagueness, Ambiguity, and Other Uncertainty in
American Criminal Laws, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 241, 277 (2002).
123. See Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494–95.
124. See, e.g., Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 227 (1951); In re Dingena, 11 I. & N.
Dec. 723, 727 (B.I.A. 1966); In re D., 1 I. & N. Dec. 143, 144–45 (B.I.A. 1941); see
also Farrell-Murray v. INS, No. 92-9549, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 10085, *7–8
(10th Cir. Apr. 28, 1993) (reasoning that theft offenses, like fraud offenses, have
historically been held to be CIMTs and therefore the term CIMT is not vague as
to the petitioner, who was convicted of shoplifting).
125. See Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737, 741 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The holdings of the Board
of Immigration Appeals are consistent with regard to some crimes but ‘there are
a number of miscellaneous cases involving indecent acts, gambling, perjury, and
other crimes where findings of moral turpitude vary widely.’” (quoting Toutoun-
jian v. INS, 959 F. Supp. 598, 603 (W.D.N.Y. 1997))).
126. See Franklin v. INS, 72 F.3d 571, 594–95 (8th Cir. 1995) (Bennett, J., dissenting)
(describing that the Jordan majority “pulled what I must respectfully suggest
was an intellectual sleight of hand” because it said that “as long as the case re-
quires the court to tread only the familiar territory of well-cultivated precedent,
the phrase ‘crime involving moral turpitude’ provides no uncomfortable uncer-
tainty;” however, the issue decided in Franklin, whether involuntary manslaugh-
ter was a CIMT, presented one of those “peripheral” or “less obvious” cases).
127. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893).
128. See, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 458 (1939); United States v.
Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875).
129. See, e.g., A. B. Small Co. v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233, 239 (1925).
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Amendment.130  Professor Hiroshi Motomura has observed that
vagueness challenges “draw upon the principles of procedural due pro-
cess because vague statutes fail to provide affected individuals with
adequate notice—a fundamental element of procedural fairness.”131
130. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008); see also Cline v. Frink Dairy
Co., 274 U.S. 445, 458 (1927) (reasoning that the same vagueness analysis, which
is rooted in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, should apply when
interpreting state statutes because of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).  There has been some discussion that the doctrine also has origins
in the Sixth Amendment’s requirement that the accused be informed of the na-
ture and cause of the accusations against him or her; “without statutory certainty
the Sixth Amendment would have provided empty protection.”  Rex Collings, Un-
constitutional Uncertainty—An Appraisal, 40 CORNELL L. Q. 195, 204 (1954). But
see Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court: A Means to an
End, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 67 n.3 (1960) [hereinafter A Means to an End]
(“[I]nasmuch as state criminal convictions have been reversed on void-for-vague-
ness grounds despite very specific indictments, this ground is at best very ques-
tionable.” (citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939); Herndon v.
Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937))).  Early courts employing the doctrine did not men-
tion a constitutional basis for their decisions.  Christina D. Lockwood, Defining
Indefiniteness: Suggested Revisions to the Void for Vagueness Doctrine, 8 CAR-
DOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 255, 263 (2010); A Means to an End, supra, at 67
n.2.  While scholars have suggested the vagueness doctrine “has nonconstitu-
tional roots in the common-law practice of the judiciary to refuse enforcement to
legislative acts deemed too uncertain to be applied,” the Court needed a constitu-
tional justification to strike down state statutes. See Ralph W. Aigler, Legislation
in Vague or General Terms, 21 MICH. L. REV. 831, 850 (1923); A Means to an End,
supra, at 67 n.2; Note, Void for Vagueness: An Escape from Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 23 IND. L J. 272, 278 (1947) [hereinafter Escape from Statutory Interpreta-
tion]  The due process clause was on the rise during that time; as Professor
Amsterdam noted, “[t]he void-for-vagueness doctrine was born in the reign of
substantive due process and throughout that epoch was successfully urged exclu-
sively in cases involving regulatory or economic-control legislation.” A Means to
an End, supra, at 74 n.38; see also Escape from Statutory Interpretation, supra, at
278 (discussing that in the early vagueness cases, “the concept was still primarily
a principle of construction and had not yet received the sanctity of being associ-
ated with the constitutional requirement of due process,” but that “it seems a
coincidence of some moment that the device of invalidating a statute for vague-
ness should develop on the federal level concurrently with the growth of the tool
of substantive due process”).  Professor Amsterdam wrote, however, that “vague-
ness alone, although helpful and important, does not provide a full and rational
explanation of the case development in which it appears so prominently;” he
noted that in the majority of early vagueness cases in the Supreme Court “there
lurked some other more or less tenable claim of liberty from government re-
straint.” A Means to an End, supra, at 74, 75 n.39.  He argued that the Supreme
Court used the vagueness doctrine to create “an insulating buffer zone of added
protection at the peripheries of several of the Bill of Rights freedoms.” Id. at 75.
131. Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Sur-
rogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1644
(1992); see also Collings, supra note 130, at 196–97 (describing procedural due
process vagueness cases as those in which the statutory language is so obscure
that it fails to give notice or provide proper standards for adjudication whereas
substantive due process cases are those where the statutory language is so broad
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In the 1903 case Yamataya v. Fisher,132 the Supreme Court held pro-
cedural due process applies to deportation proceedings.133  The Court
in Yamataya reasoned that a noncitizen’s entry into the U.S., which
made her “subject in all respects to [United States] jurisdiction, and a
part of its population, although alleged to be illegally here”134 meant
she could not be deported without “giving [her] all opportunity to be
heard upon the question involving [her] right to be and remain in the
United States.”135 Thus, for noncitizens who have entered the U.S.
whom the government is seeking to deport, Yamataya unquestionably
guarantees the right to procedural due process in those proceed-
ings.136  In fact, the Fifth Amendment Due Process clause is the only
that it prohibits conduct the legislature is not allowed to prohibit such as freedom
of speech); Austin W. Scott, Jr., Constitutional Limitations on Substantive Crimi-
nal Law, 29 ROCKY MOUNTAIN. L. REV. 275, 288 (1956) (“The [void for vagueness]
rule is part of the broader principle of constitutional law that due process re-
quires proper notice, and is closely analogous to the more specific rule of procedu-
ral due process that trial upon a vague indictment or information is similarly
unconstitutional.”). But see Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation
Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 130 n.147 (1998) (reason-
ing that “vagueness cases sit at the border of substance and procedure” because
knowing the law is a substantive concern in addition to a procedural right, and
curbing arbitrary decisions is “closely tied to contemporary notions of procedural
due process”).  Professor Tammy W. Sun writes, “[T]he vagueness doctrine has
dual aspects—it is a procedural rule concerned with fair notice, on one hand, and
a substantive rule concerned with equality, on the other.”  Tammy W. Sun,
Equality by Other Means: The Substantive Foundations of the Vagueness Doc-
trine, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 149, 150 (2011). She reasons that “[i]n the lat-
ter half of the 20th century, the Supreme Court has gone so far as to privilege the
substantive strand of the doctrine as ‘perhaps the most meaningful aspect of the
vagueness doctrine.’” Id. at 151 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574
(1974)); see also Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Crim-
inal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591, 661 (1980) (describing that in a case like
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), “vagueness doctrine—a
procedure-oriented constitutional jurisprudence—is in this manner used to strike
down substantively objectionable statutes”).
132. 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 101.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 100–01.  What sort of process is due in deportation proceedings is another
question altogether.  Professor Motomura wrote that while the Yamataya deci-
sion “planted the seed from which the procedural due process exception [to the
plenary power doctrine] grew . . . the results did not match the rhetoric.”
Motomura, supra note 131, at 1638. He reasons that courts could easily rational-
ize limited procedural protections, because the Court in Yamataya “found no pro-
cedural due process violation where the government had deported an alien who
did not understand English, had not received notice of the charges against her,
and had not been allowed to consult with friends or with a lawyer.” Id. (citing
Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 90, 101–02); see also id.  (“Other decisions during the
1950s repeated the earlier pattern of readiness to recite a procedural due process
requirement and a reluctance to apply it for an alien’s benefit.” (citing Carlson v.
Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954))).
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source of constitutional rights in deportation proceedings; other con-
stitutional protections such as the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
and trial by jury do not apply.137  Therefore, despite the fact that the
consequences of a civil deportation statute are civil only, the vague-
ness doctrine, which is rooted in the Due Process Clause, should
apply.138
A challenge to the term CIMT in the exclusion statute, however, is
unlikely to prevail.  In exclusion proceedings, due process rights are
virtually nonexistent.139  Because of Congress’ plenary power over im-
migration law, which stems from its powers to regulate national se-
curity and sovereignty,140  Congress ultimately has complete power to
decide what process is due.141  As the Supreme Court famously stated
in 1950, “Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due
process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”142  Due to these
nonexistent due process rights, the Supreme Court has refused to ap-
ply the vagueness doctrine to a statute dealing with exclusion.143
137. See Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign
Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 392–93 (2006) (“[O]nly the Due Process Clause
protects noncitizens in deportation proceedings . . . Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights, prominent features of criminal trials, do not apply in deportation proceed-
ings except to the limited extent that ‘fundamental fairness’ requires them.”).
138. See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951).
139. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L. J. 545,
560 (1990) (discussing key immigration due process decisions from the 1950s and
reasoning that “aliens ‘outside’ the United States would continue to find it very
difficult to raise any constitutional challenge to immigration decisions”); Stumpf,
supra note 137, at 392–93.
140. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892); Chae Chan Ping v.
United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603–04, 606 (1889) (reasoning that if the U.S. could
not exclude noncitizens, “it would be to that extent subject to the control of an-
other power” because it could not defend itself against “vast hordes of . . . people
crowding in upon us”).
141. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
142. Id. Professor Henry Hart, in his famous dialogue on the power of Congress to
control jurisdiction of the federal courts, criticized the Court’s holding in Knauff,
stating: “[T]he Constitution always applies when a court is sitting with jurisdic-
tion in habeas corpus.”  Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV.
1362, 1393 (1953).  Professor Hart reasoned:
Granting that the requirements of due process must vary with the cir-
cumstances, and allowing them all the flexibility that can conceivably be
claimed, it still remains true that the Court is obliged, by the presupposi-
tions of its whole jurisdiction in this area, to decide whether what has
been done is consistent with due process—and not simply to pass the
buck to an assertedly all-powerful and unimpeachable Congress.
Id. at 1394.
143. See Boutelier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967).  In Boutelier, the Court upheld a stat-
ute that authorized the deportation of a person who was excludable at the time of
entry into the U.S.  The noncitizen was excludable at his entry because he “was
afflicted with a class A condition, namely, psychopathic personality, sexual devi-
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However, there is an exception to the rule that noncitizens “outside”
the U.S. cannot claim due process protections.144  The Supreme Court
held in Landon v. Plasencia145 that lawful permanent residents who
are placed in exclusion proceedings upon a return from a trip
abroad146 may invoke due process protections.147  The Court rea-
ate,” due to his homosexual conduct. Id. at 120.  The Court repeatedly stated that
he was not being deported for post-entry conduct, which would have triggered
due process rights. Id. at 123–24; see also Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 90,
100–01 (1903) (holding that procedural protections of Due Process clause apply in
deportation proceedings).  Finding there was “no indication that the post-entry
evidence [of homosexual acts] was of any consequence in the ultimate decision of
the doctors, the hearing officer or the court,” the Court reasoned that due process
did not require any warning about acts that would cause deportation, since they
were already committed upon entry, when his due process rights were essentially
nonexistent. Boutelier, 387 U.S. at 123–24.  Thus, even though the Boutelier case
involved a deportation statute, it involved a condition that existed at entry; there-
fore, the Court held, “[t]he constitutional requirement of fair warning has no ap-
plicability to standards such as are laid down in § 212(a)(4) for admission of
aliens to the United States.” Id. at 123.  The Court did engage in some vagueness
analysis notwithstanding its decision that the doctrine did not apply to the stat-
ute at issue, stating: “It may be, to some, that ‘psychopathic personality’ is a med-
ically ambiguous term, including several separate and distinct afflictions,” the
Court discussed how the legislative history narrowed the meaning of the term
such that it was clear that homosexual conduct was included in the definition of
“psychopathic personality.” Id. at 124; see also Massieu v. Reno, 915 F. Supp.
681, 701 (D.N.J. 1996), rev’d, 91 F.3d 416 (3d Cir. 1996) (reasoning that in Boute-
lier, “the statute, read in conjunction with its legislative history, provided no-
tice—though somewhat fictitiously so—that homosexual aliens were
excludable”).
144. See Motomura, supra note 139, at 579 (discussing the case of Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982), in which the Court held that a returning perma-
nent resident can invoke the Due Process clause even though she is technically
“outside” the United States).
145. 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
146. The petitioner in Landon was subject to the “reentry doctrine,” whereby any at-
tempted entry by a noncitizen, not just her first entry, subjects her to all of the
exclusion grounds. See Motomura, supra note 131, at 1643 n.91, 1653 n.148; see
also United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422, 425 (1933) (interpreting
the statutory definition of “entry” to include those who seek to reenter the U.S.
and therefore applying exclusion ground to returning resident).  In Rosenberg v.
Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963), the Supreme Court held a returning permanent resi-
dent was not subject to the exclusion grounds if his absence was “innocent, cas-
ual, and brief.” Id. at 461–62.  In Landon, the petitioner’s departure was not
innocent and she faced exclusion. Landon, 459 U.S. at 29–30.  Congress later
codified when lawful permanent residents would be subject to the exclusion
grounds; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C) (2006) states that lawful permanent residents
“shall not be regarded as seeking an admission into the United States” unless the
lawful permanent resident has abandoned or relinquished that status, has been
absent from the United States for a continuous period in excess of 180 days, has
engaged in illegal activity after having departed the United States, has departed
from the United States while in removal proceedings, has committed an offense
rendering him inadmissible, or is attempting to enter at a time or place other
than as designated by immigration officers or has not been admitted to the
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soned, “[O]nce an alien gains admission to our country and begins to
develop the ties that go with permanent residence, [her] constitutional
status changes accordingly.”148  This Article, therefore, does not go so
far as to propose that the term CIMT in the exclusion statute should
be void for vagueness.  Only when the term CIMT is applied to exclude
lawful permanent residents from admission should it be void for
vagueness.149
3. Strictness of the Vagueness Test
How strict a vagueness test should courts apply to a deportation
statute?  Deportation is nothing close to an economic regulation,
which the Court has held requires a less strict vagueness test.150  The
Court has reasoned that economic regulations are narrower in
scope.151  In addition, businesspersons who are potentially subject to
economic regulation are expected to use greater diligence in figuring
out where the line is drawn to subject them to statutory prohibi-
United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.  Sev-
eral courts of appeals have reasoned that the so-called “Fleuti doctrine” did not
survive following the passage of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C). See, e.g., De Vega v.
Gonzales, 503 F.3d 45, 47–48 (1st Cir. 2007); Malagon de Fuentes v. Gonzales,
462 F.3d 498, 501 (5th Cir. 2006); Tineo v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 382, 394–95 (3d Cir.
2003).
147. See Landon, 459 U.S. at 32–34.  Professor David Martin, discussing the Landon
decision, reasoned that what process is due, or “owed” to a noncitizen rightly does
not depend on the arbitrary line between whether the noncitizen is in exclusion
or deportation proceedings. See David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership
in the National Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PITT. L. REV.
165, 192, 214–15 (1983).  Rather, he argues that a noncitizen’s level of member-
ship in the U.S. should govern how much process is due to the noncitizen; a re-
turning lawful permanent resident has “high-level membership” in the United
States, which is unaffected by her travel abroad. See id. A noncitizen arriving
for the first time, by contrast, is in the outer-most ring of membership, “at the
threshold of entry into the national community;” therefore, the returning resident
should be given more process. See id. at 192, 216. But see T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and “Community Ties:” A Response to Martin, 44
U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 244–45 (1983) (arguing that due process should turn not on
the person’s membership in the United States community—the United States’
relationship to her—but rather on her community ties—what the United States
is taking from her).
148. Landon, 459 U.S. at 329.
149. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) (2006) (stating that a lawful permanent resident
“shall not be regarded as seeking an admission into the United States for pur-
poses of the immigration laws unless the alien . . . has committed an offense
identified in [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)] . . . .); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2006)
(rendering inadmissible a noncitizen convicted of, or who admits having commit-
ted the essential elements of, a CIMT).
150. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983); Vill. of Hoffman Estates v.
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–99 (1982).
151. See Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498; Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405
U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
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tions.152  In contrast, CIMT is quite broad, a legislative “catch-all” as
some have stated,153 leaving “ample room for differing definitions of
the term.”154  Also, noncitizens, unlike businesspersons, “are not in
business and not alerted to the regulatory schemes”155 of deportation
laws; “and we assume that they would have no understanding of their
meaning and impact if they read them.”156
This Article proposes that courts apply the same vagueness analy-
sis to CIMT in deportation law as it would to a criminal statute.  The
Supreme Court has given its blessing to this approach; in Jordan, the
Supreme Court stated it would analyze the deportation statute under
the “established criteria of the ‘void for vagueness’ doctrine” because of
deportation’s harsh consequences, notwithstanding deportation being
civil in nature.157  The Court cited vagueness decisions interpreting
criminal law statutes as the “established criteria” of the vagueness
doctrine.158  In addition, a recent decision by the Second Circuit inter-
preted Jordan to authorize applying the vagueness doctrine to a de-
portation statute as though it were a criminal statute, due to the
severity of deportation.159
One court, discussing the civil-criminal distinction when applying
the vagueness analysis, stated that rather than focus on whether a
statutory term merely has a label of “civil” or “criminal,” a more func-
tionalist approach guides courts to apply the vagueness doctrine based
on “the seriousness of what is at stake under the statutory scheme.”160
The Supreme Court has stated deportation is a “drastic measure.”161
The Court in Padilla discussed several changes to immigration law
“that have dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen’s criminal
152. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 2.3(a), at 147 n.8 (2d ed.
2003).
153. See John S. Bradway, Moral Turpitude as the Criterion of Offenses that Justify
Disbarment, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 9, 14 (1935).
154. In re Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1188, 1191 (B.I.A. 1999) (quoting Franklin v.
INS, 72 F.3d 571, 573 (8th Cir. 1995)).
155. See Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162–63.
156. See id.
157. See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951).
158. See id. at 230 (citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); United States
v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921)).
159. See Arriaga v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that the depor-
tation ground for crimes of stalking at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2006) is not
void for vagueness).  The court reasoned, however, “We need not decide whether
the INA stalking provision should be assessed as a civil or criminal statute be-
cause even under the close scrutiny accorded criminal laws, Arriaga’s vagueness
challenge fails.” Id.
160. Corp. of Haverford Coll. v. Reeher, 329 F. Supp. 1196, 1203 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
161. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010) (quoting Fong Haw Tan v.
Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)).
672 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:647
conviction.”162  Using a functionalist approach, deportation is quite se-
rious, “quasi-criminal” indeed,163 and therefore merits a “relatively
strict [vagueness] test.”164
One also can argue the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla now
brings deportation out of its “quasi-criminal” status, into the realm of
criminal punishment.165  The Court reasoned that because of the
changes in immigration law, deportation is “practically inevitable” as
a result of a conviction for a removable offense.166  Thus, the Court
stated that “deportation is an integral part—indeed, sometimes the
most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on nonci-
tizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes”167 and that it is
“ ‘most difficult’ to divorce the penalty from the conviction in the depor-
tation context.”168 Professor Kanstroom argues that although the
Court did not say deportation is punishment, the “majority opinion
cannot fully be squared with the historical, formalist relegation of de-
portation to the realm of civil, collateral consequences . . . .”169  Be-
cause of the Court’s most recent discussion of deportation as more
than even “quasi-criminal,”170 courts should analyze CIMT in a depor-
tation statute as though it were a criminal statute.
B. Fair Notice
The Court has given two primary reasons for the void-for-vague-
ness doctrine: (1) providing fair notice to persons affected by the stat-
ute; and (2) discouraging arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of
162. See id.; see also Note, Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude, 43 HARV. L. REV. 117,
121 (1929) [hereinafter Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude] (arguing that “it is in
the Immigration Act that the phraseology [CIMT] seems most unfortunate.
Though proceedings under the act are not criminal, they are sufficiently severe in
their application to be in their nature penal.”).
163. See Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499
(1982); Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some
Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1889
(2000).
164. See Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499.
165. See Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky:
The Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L.
REV. 1461, 1507 (2011); Peter Markowitz, Deportation is Different, 13 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1299, 1306 (2011).
166. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1481.  Professor Kanstroom argues that the “virtually inevitable” reasoning
in Padilla “enabled the Court to build an analytic bridge between criminal prose-
cution and deportation without going too far too fast.”  Kanstroom, supra note
165, at 1486.
169. Kanstroom, supra note 165, at 1466.
170. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480–81; Kanstroom, supra note 165, at 1463.
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the statute.171  This Article focuses on the fair notice rationale for the
vagueness doctrine.  The Court has described the fair notice require-
ment as follows: “A statute which either forbids or requires the doing
of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, vio-
lates the first essential of due process of law.”172  To determine
whether a law has provided fair notice, a court must ask whether the
law is “so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain
as to the conduct it prohibits.”173  Courts have focused not on a partic-
ular defendant, but on a hypothetical ordinary person.174  The Court
has explained that the fair notice requirement prevents trapping the
innocent.175  The Court has expressed concern that “uncertain mean-
ings inevitably lead citizens to steer far wider of the unlawful zone
171. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000).  In the early vagueness cases, the
Court focused on separation of powers and notice as the two rationales for voiding
vague statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875) (“It
would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to
catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who
could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large. This would, to some
extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department of the government.”).
The separation of powers rationale faded, however, and the concern for prevent-
ing arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement came to be a primary reason for
voiding vague statutes. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 351, 358 (1983);
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974) (“[P]erhaps the most meaningful as-
pect of the vagueness doctrine is not actual notice, but the other principal ele-
ment of the doctrine—the requirement that a legislature establish minimal
guidelines to govern law enforcement.”); Andrew Goldsmith, The Void-for-Vague-
ness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, Revisited, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 279, 282 (2003).
172. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
173. Giacco v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402 (1966).  The Court added that a vague
statute “leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed stan-
dards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case.” Id. at 402–03.
174. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (writing that a vague
statute is one that fails “to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of
what is prohibited”); City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 58 (1999) (“[T]he
purpose of the fair notice requirement is to enable the ordinary citizen to conform
his or her conduct to the law.  ‘No one may be required at peril of life, liberty, or
property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes.’” (quoting Lanzetta v.
New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939))); Robert Batey, Vagueness and the Con-
struction of Criminal Statutes—A Balancing Act, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 4
(1997).
175. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972); see also LAURENCE TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-31, at 1033 (2d ed. 1988) (“[I]n any particu-
lar area, the legislature confronts a dilemma: to draft with narrow particularity
is to risk nullification by easy evasion of the legislative purpose; to draft with
great generality is to risk ensnarement of the innocent in a net designed for
others.”).
674 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:647
than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.”176
If, out of caution, individuals avoid certain behavior because they do
not know what the law prohibits, they may avoid constitutionally pro-
tected177 or desirable behavior.178
An otherwise vague statutory term will not be invalidated if the
statutory language has come to mean something through case law,179
legislative history,180 specialized definitions,181 common understand-
ing,182 context,183 or when law enforcement agencies have created a
176. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109.
177. See A Means to an End, supra note 130, at 75 (reasoning that the vagueness
doctrine creates an “insulating buffer zone of added protection at the peripheries
of several of the Bill of Rights freedoms”); Collings, supra note 130, at 196–97,
218–19.
178. In Papachristou, the Supreme Court voided a vagrancy ordinance, stating its con-
cern that the broad language of the statute could prevent such innocent acts as
walking, strolling, loafing, loitering, or wandering.  Papachristou v. City of Jack-
sonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164. (1972).  While the Court did not declare such activi-
ties constitutionally protected, the Court reasoned “these activities are
historically part of the amenities of life as we have known them.” Id.
179. See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2929 (2010) (“It has long been our
practice, however, before striking a federal statute as impermissibly vague, to
consider whether the prescription is amenable to a limiting construction.”); Wain-
wright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 22 (1973) (reasoning that when evaluating a vague-
ness challenge a court must evaluate the statute as it has been interpreted by the
highest court of the state).  Professor Amsterdam noted that this rationale al-
lowing state courts’ gloss on a statute to clarify otherwise vague statutory terms
is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Reese that “it would cer-
tainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all
possible offenders and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be
rightfully detained and who should be set at large.” A Means to an End, supra
note 130, at 74 (quoting United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875)).
180. See Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 124 (1967); Schellong v. INS, 805 F.2d 655,
661–62 (7th Cir. 1986).
181. See Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 502 (1925); Omaechevarria
v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 348 (1917).
182. To glean a common understanding, the Court has consulted dictionaries to define
a seemingly vague term; this exercise does not always yield a sufficiently clear
meaning. See Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455
U.S. 489, 501 (1982); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 234 (1951) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 455 n.3 (1939).  Statutes that
have been in existence for a long period of time also can accumulate a common
understanding. See Goldsmith, supra note 171, at 303; Note, Due Process and
Definiteness in Statutes, 62 HARV. L. REV. 76, 83 (1948); see also United States v.
Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 524 (1942) (“For years, thousands of corporations have filed
income tax returns in accordance with the direction to deduct ‘a reasonable allow-
ance for salaries or other compensation for personal service actually rendered,’
and there has not been any apparent general confusion bespeaking inadequate
statutory guidance.”). But see Jordan, 341 U.S. at 230 n.14  (“Of course, the mere
existence of a statute for over sixty years does not provide immunity from consti-
tutional attack.  We have recently held an equally vague statute unconstitutional
for vagueness.” (citing Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948))); id. at 238–39
(Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[V]enerability of a vague phrase may be an argument
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meaning.184  Similarly, courts are less likely to void statutes for vague
terms when the legislature has empowered an administrative agency
to make interpretive regulations,185 when the legislature adds
narrowing definitions to an otherwise vague term,186 or when the
statute has adopted common law terms.187  Such language survives
vagueness challenges because courts have somewhere else to look to
determine a statute’s meaning,188 provided that the interpretation
sufficiently narrows the statute’s meaning.189  Also, a lawyer repre-
for its validity when the passing years have by administrative practice or judicial
construction served to make it clear as a word of legal art.”).
183. For example, the Supreme Court in Grayned upheld an antinoise ordinance,
which unlike a “vague, general ‘breach of peace’ ordinance, . . . . [was] written
specifically for the school context, where the prohibited disturbances are easily
measured by their impact on the normal activities of school.”  Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 112 (1972).  The Court reasoned, “Given this ‘particular
context,’ the ordinance gives ‘fair notice to those to whom [it] is directed.’” Id.
(citing American Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412 (1950)).
184. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 355–57; Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767,
771–76 (1977); Goldsmith, supra note 171, at 295–301.
185. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. at 752–53 (upholding a vagueness challenge to cer-
tain articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and reasoning that otherwise
vague statutory terms have been clarified through regulations, an agency man-
ual, and decisions of the United States Court of Military Appeals); see also Jeffrey
I. Tilden, Big Mama Rag: An Inquiry Into Vagueness, 67 VA. L. REV. 1543,
1558–59 (1981) (“Where a responsible governmental entity, such as the Federal
Election Commission, the general counsel of a particular agency, or a state liquor
authority, can rule in advance whether the proposed conduct would violate the
statute in question, the Court may be less sympathetic to a vagueness chal-
lenge.”); Note, Requirement of Definiteness in Statutory Standards, 53 MICH. L.
REV. 264, 270 (1954) (“[I]t has been asserted that less definiteness is required of
an administratively executed statute, the sole requisite being that the basic stan-
dards set up must be sufficiently definite and precise to enable those affected to
determine whether the administrator or quasi-legislative board is exceeding his
or its authority in promulgating a regulation under the statute.”).
186. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2720 (2010); Posters ‘N’
Things v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 526 (1994).
187. See, e.g., Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 (1975); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S.
373, 377 (1913); see also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952)
(reasoning that when the legislature “borrows terms of art in which are accumu-
lated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably
knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word
in the body of learning from which it was taken”).
188. See LAFAVE, supra note 152, § 2.3(b), at 146–47; cf. Coates v. City of Cincinnati,
402 U.S. 611, 613 (1971) (voiding a Cincinnati unlawful assembly ordinance for
vagueness because the state courts had not limited the definition in any mean-
ingful way, which left the Court “relegated, at best, to the words of the ordinance
itself”); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 514 (1948) (“The interpretation by
the [state court] puts these words in the statute as definitely as if it had been so
amended by the legislature.”).
189. See Winters, 333 U.S. at 518–19 (reasoning that the judicial interpretations of a
vague statute did not save it from being voided because “even considering the
gloss put upon the literal meaning by the [state court] . . . we find the [statute] too
uncertain and indefinite to justify the conviction of this petitioner”); Connally v.
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senting a person potentially affected by the statute can develop
an educated guess as to the term’s meaning and thus give fair
notice to the regulated party of what conduct to avoid.190  There are,
however, limits to these “cures.”191  For example, when a term is
used in other statutes, this does not necessarily create meaning;192
Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 394–95 (1926) (reasoning that although court de-
cisions interpreted a vague statutory term, “the result is not to remove the obscu-
rity, but rather to offer a choice of uncertainties”); United States v. L. Cohen
Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89–90 (1921) (noting that conflicting interpretations of
a statute does not cure, but rather highlights, the vagueness of the statute).
190. See LAFAVE, supra note 152, § 2.3(b), at 146–47.  The problem with the rationale
of fair notice is that it really is what Professor John Calvin Jeffries calls “lawyer’s
notice”—whether an advocate representing a person potentially facing charges of
violating a statute can figure out that certain acts violate the statute. See John
Calvin Jeffries, Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Criminal Statutes, 7
VA. L. REV. 189, 208, 211 (1985) (reasoning that in “the ordinary case, the notice
given must be recovered from sources so various and inaccessible as to render the
concept distinctly unrealistic”); see also Batey, supra note 174, at 4–5 (“The
trouble with this standard [fair notice] is that ordinary people do not spend much
of their time reading statute books.  Nor do they spend any time studying the
cases that interpret criminal statutes, even though it is settled law that such
glosses on criminal statutes can ‘cure’ their vagueness.”); Due Process Require-
ment of Definiteness in Statutes, supra note 182, at 79 (“the wider latitude thus
allowed terms with well-settled legal meanings does not impair statutory defi-
niteness from the standpoint of legal experts, but it is certainly incompatible with
a requirement of precise notice to the layman himself of just what he can and
cannot do”). But see Lockwood, supra note 130, at 311–13 (disagreeing with Jef-
fries’ characterization of this rationale as “lawyer’s notice” by citing several Su-
preme Court opinions that, when discussing fair notice, refer consistently to
“common” or “ordinary men” and reasoning that the Court has never “required
[that] the law provide actual notice or even precise guidelines, but has instead set
the standard at reasonable certainty within the language of the enacted law, and
has advised that individuals bear some risk in having to estimate whether their
behavior is ‘perilously close’ to prohibited conduct”).
191. See Goldsmith, supra note 171, at 294–95.
192. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 582 n.31 (1974) (holding a statute void for
vagueness despite “the universal adoption of [similar] statutes by the Federal
and State governments”); Winters, 333 U.S. at 511, 519. But see Grayned v. City
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 111 (1972) (referencing Illinois Supreme Court opin-
ions interpreting a Chicago, Illinois, ordinance prohibiting disturbing the peace,
which limited the statute’s application to situations where there is an imminent
threat of violence, to a Rockford, Illinois, ordinance with similar language); Jor-
dan v. De George, 333 U.S. 223, 227 (1951).  Andrew Goldsmith, referencing Jor-
dan, wrote that “the Court has not used one [federal] statute to lend meaning to
another since 1951;” this is because such a method of construction would create
federal criminal common law.  Goldsmith, supra note 171, at 305–06; see also
Jordan, 341 U.S. at 240 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“The use of the phrase [CIMT]
by state courts for various civil proceedings affords no teaching for federal courts.
The Federal Government has no common-law crimes and the judges are not per-
mitted to define crimes by decision, for they rest solely in statute.”); Screws  v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91, 152 (1945) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“It was settled
early in our history that prosecutions in the federal courts could not be founded
on any undefined body of so-called common law.”); Franklin v. INS, 72 F.3d 571,
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nor can related statutes illuminate the meaning of a vague
term.193
The Supreme Court in Jordan held that the term “CIMT” gives
adequate notice to noncitizens.  From what sources did the Court im-
port meaning into the term, to “cure” the vagueness?  This is not a
statutory term for which Congress has taken care to “add narrowing
definitions.”194  Nor does the legislative history shed any light on the
meaning of the term, as “Congress knowingly conceived it in confu-
sion.”195  Congress’s only legislative goal appears to have been to de-
port undesirable noncitizens from the U.S.196  The only common
understanding of the term is its dictionary definition, which refers to
“an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity.”197 This is just as vague as
the words “moral turpitude;”198 the meaning of these words can vary
depending on the decision-maker’s idea of what is base, vile, or de-
praved.199  The Court has found statutes to be void for vagueness
when the “judicial gloss” given a statutory term by a state court does
not remedy the statute’s uncertainty.200
According to the majority in Jordan, the term was clearly defined
in case law, at least with respect to fraud offenses.201  As discussed
above, a statute will not be invalidated for vagueness if the meaning of
the term has developed a meaning in case law.202  In addition, vague
595 (8th Cir. 1995)  (Bennett, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Jordan majority’s
reliance on the use of the term CIMT in other areas of law to overcome the stat-
ute’s uncertainty and reasoning that “[c]omparative uncertainty isn’t the stan-
dard for ‘vagueness;’ due notice of consequences, by the Court’s own statement, is
the applicable standard” (citing Jordan, 341 U.S. at 231–32; Connally, 269 U.S.
at 385)).
193. See Goguen, 415 U.S. at 579 (rejecting government’s argument that the challenge
statute took on meaning from the more specific accompanying language in the
statute); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 262 (1937); Goldsmith, supra note 171,
at 303.
194. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2720 (2010); see also
Hamdan v. INS, 98 F.3d 183, 185 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that the term CIMT is
undefined in the statute).
195. See Jordan, 341 U.S. at 233 (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also Harms, supra note
10, at 260 (proposing that Congress should define the term to CIMT to remedy
the lack of clarity about the term).
196. See supra section II.A.
197. See, e.g., In re Danesh, 19 I. & N. Dec. 669, 670 (B.I.A. 1988).
198. See Jordan, 341 U.S. at 234–35 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
199. See Bradway, supra note 153, at 16 (“The relative character of the words ‘base-
ness,’ ‘vileness,’ ‘depravity’ makes an absolute definition of little value.”).
200. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 518–19 (reasoning that “even considering
the gloss put upon the literal meaning by the Court of Appeals . . . we find the
[statute] too uncertain and indefinite to justify conviction of this petitioner.).  But
cf. In re D-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 143, 193 (B.I.A. 1941) (reasoning that these words give
the otherwise vague term CIMT “a definition sufficiently accurate for this case”).
201. See Jordan, 341 U.S. at 227–29.
202. See Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 22 (1973).
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terms are permissible when an agency can apply the first gloss to give
them meaning.203  Congress gave the BIA authority to interpret the
term CIMT;204 accordingly, the term CIMT has spawned much BIA
case law, thus giving the term a somewhat settled meaning.  The
State Department also has adopted guidance on its meaning.205
These agency definitions can cure the ambiguity in the term CIMT,
giving noncitizens and their lawyers cases and agency guidance to
consult.206  Judges and immigration officers can rely on agency gui-
dance, precedent decisions by the BIA, and federal court decisions de-
fining CIMT; for example, convictions involving fraud,207 theft,208 and
sexual offenses209 all have been held to be CIMTs.
However, there are numerous statutes, like the one Manuel was
charged with violating, that do not fit into one of these “easy” catego-
ries.  In these cases, the immigration judge must decide whether a cer-
tain offense is “conduct that shocks the public conscience as being
inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the rules of morality
and the duties owed between man and man, either one’s fellow man or
society in general,”210 by reference to “moral standards generally pre-
vailing in the U.S.”211  Under this standard, the BIA has stated, “the
nature of a crime is measured against contemporary moral standards
and may be susceptible to change based on the prevailing views of
society.”212
1. Deportation for a Sin?
The term CIMT allows immigration judges to make judgments
about the “moral standards prevailing at the time,”213 thus placing
them in the role of God, passing judgment on the morals of the nonci-
203. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 752–53 (1974).
204. See Cabral v. INS, 15 F.3d 193, 195 (1st Cir. 1994) (reasoning that the legislative
history behind CIMT, which indicated a lack of clarity on the meaning of the
term, “leaves no doubt . . . that Congress left the term ‘crime involving moral
turpitude’ to further administrative and judicial interpretation”).
205. See 9 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 40.21(a), N2 (synthesizing BIA and federal
court decisions on the meaning of CIMT).
206. See Goldsmith, supra note 171, at  294–95.
207. See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 227 (1951); In re Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec.
225, 228 (B.I.A. 1980).
208. See Tillinghast v. Edmead, 21 F.2d 81, 83 (1st Cir. 1929); In re D-, 1 I. & N. Dec.
143, 144–45 (B.I.A. 1941).
209. See Mehboob v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 272, 277–79 (3d Cir. 2008); In re Dingena, 11
I. & N. Dec. 723, 727 (B.I.A. 1966).
210. See In re Danesh, 19 I. & N. Dec. 669, 670 (B.I.A. 1988).
211. 22 C.F.R. § 40.21(a)(1) (2011); In re McNaughton, 16 I. &. N. Dec. 569, 573 (B.I.A.
1978).
212. In re Torres-Varela, 23 I. & N. Dec. 78, 83 (B.I.A. 2001); In re G-, 1 I. & N. Dec.
59, 60 (B.I.A. 1941).
213. 22 C.F.R. § 40.21(a)(1) (2011); McNaughton, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 573.
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tizens whose cases lie in their hands.214  Looking more closely at the
history of the term CIMT, one learns of its inherently religious nature.
The term CIMT did not make its way across the Atlantic with the Pil-
grims, yet its oft-used substitute, mala in se, derives from English
common law.215  William Blackstone, in his famous Commentaries on
the Laws of England, highlighted the religious connotation of the dis-
tinction between mala in se and mala prohibita, writing that “crimes
and misdemeanors that are forbidden by the superior laws and there-
fore styled mala in se . . . contract no additional turpitude from being
declared unlawful by the inferior legislature.  For that legislature, in
all these cases acts only . . . in subordination to the great lawgiver,
transcribing and publishing his precepts.”216  On the other hand,
214. See United States ex rel. Manzella v. Zimmerman, 71 F. Supp. 534, 537 (E.D. Pa.
1947) (reasoning that it is “most unfortunate that Congress has chosen to base
the right of a resident alien to remain in this country upon the application of a
phrase so lacking in legal precision and, therefore, so likely to result in a judge
applying to the case before him his own personal views as to the mores of the
community”); United States ex. rel. Griffo v. McCandless, 28 F.2d 287, 288 (E.D.
Pa. 1928) (discussing legislative intent of term CIMT in 1917 deportation statute
and stating that Congress may “have had in mind those acts which are not only
condemned by the law and denounced as criminal, but those which the extralegal
moral sense pronounces to evidence moral turpitude or depravity”).
215. See Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude, supra note 162, at 118.  Unlike many le-
gal terms that were adopted into the U.S. system from the English system, the
term CIMT was never used in English case law. See id. at 118 n.7.  English law
classified crimes as either a felony or misdemeanor or mala in se or mala prohib-
ita; other categories of offenses were crimen falsi and infamous crimes. See id. at
118 (defining crimen falsi, a term imported from the civil law, to cover such
crimes as forgery, perjury, and dealing with false weights or coins and stating
that infamous crimes have been regarded as including crimen falsi).  U.S. legisla-
tors rejected these traditional English categories of crimes due to their uncer-
tainty and conflicting precedent on the meaning of the terms. Id.  As civil
statutes referred to criminal offenses, legislators needed a classification that was
less tenuous; thus was introduced the term CIMT into U.S. common law.  Note,
The Distinction Between Mala Prohibita and Mala in Se in Criminal Law, 30
COLUM. L. REV. 74, 86 (1930) [hereinafter The Distinction Between Mala Prohib-
ita and Mala in Se] (while this student note is unsigned, it was written by Profes-
sor Herbert Weschler when he was a law student).  There are many courts that
classify offenses as crimes involving moral turpitude if the crimes are mala in se
as opposed to mala prohibita. See, e.g., Efagene v. Holder, 642 F.3d 918, 922
(10th Cir. 2011); Castle v. INS, 541 F.2d 1064, 1066 (4th Cir. 1976); In re E-, 2 I.
& N. Dec. 134. 141 (1944). But see Nicanor-Romero v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 992,
998 (9th Cir. 2008); McCandless, 28 F.2d at 288.  Professor Herbert Weschler has
suggested that courts fell back on the familiar mala in se/mala prohibita distinc-
tion when defining CIMT, even though the term was introduced to shed this
traditional English classification. See The Distinction Between Mala Prohibita
and Mala in Se, supra, at 85–86.  Therefore, it appears the term CIMT is merely
a New World label to an English common law tradition. See id. at 86; Crimes
Involving Moral Turpitude, supra note 162, at 118.
216. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *54.  Blackstone cited common law of-
fenses such as murder, theft, and perjury as mala in se offenses. Id. at *54–58.
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wrote Blackstone, mala prohibita offenses involve no “moral offense,
or sin,” and “no moral guilt.”217  The distinction required that humans
not only believe in a fundamental divine law, but also be able to dis-
cern and implement that law.218  As Judge Anderson of the First Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals wrote in 1929, “Blackstone’s assumption of
personal knowledge from ‘the Great Lawgiver’ as to what offenses
were mala in se and ‘can contract no additional turpitude by being
declared unlawful by the inferior Legislature,’ I think absurd.”219
The problem with both terms, CIMT and mala in se, is that they
are loaded with religious overtones and hark back to a day when
217. Id. at *57–58; see also Nancy Travis Wolfe, Mala in Se: A Disappearing Doctrine,
19 CRIMINOLOGY 131, 139 (1981) (“In other words, the ‘evil’ [of a mala prohibita
offense] is imputed by the state.”).  The first judicial use of the terms mala in se
and mala prohibita was by Chief Justice Fineux in 1496. The Distinction Be-
tween Mala Prohibita and Mala in Se, supra note 215, at 74.  The term was used
in connection with the dispensing power of the crown; the king could grant an
individual leave to commit an offense malum prohibitum, but not one malum in
se. See id.  Acts of parliament, which were exercises of the king’s legislative pre-
rogative, could be violated at the king’s will. See id. at 76–77.  However, because
the church held ultimate authority over questions of morality, it was not possible
that the king, a mere mortal, could allow his favorites to contravene the laws of
God. See id. The practice of dispensations was abolished by the Bill of Rights in
1689; however, the term did not disappear when the dispensation power disap-
peared from law. See id. at 77.
218. Wolfe, supra note 217, at 136–37.
219. Tillinghast v. Edmead, 31 F.2d 81, 84 (Anderson, J., dissenting); see also JEREMY
BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES 80 (Charles Warren Everett ed.,
1928) (describing “that acute distinction between mala in se, and mala prohibita;
which being so shrewd and sounding so pretty, and being in Latin, has no sort of
an occasion to have any meaning to it: accordingly it has none.”); J. W. C. Turner,
The Mental Element in Crimes at Common Law, in THE MODERN APPROACH TO
CRIMINAL LAW 195, 221 (L. Radzinowicz & J. W. C. Turner eds., 1945) (“Some of
the weak points in the doctrine were detected by an early editor of Blackstone,
and in modern times it is generally regarded as quite discredited.”).  Not all defi-
nitions of mala in se overtly cite religious authority.  For example, jurists have
described mala in se offenses as those that violate the laws of nature.  Wolfe,
supra note 217, at 137.  However, “citation of natural law as the source of the
mala in se designation implies a sense of right and human nature which has a
universal quality.” See id. at 137.  Professor Calvin Woodard wrote that because
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw the rise of the secular state and a
decline in the authority of the church, legal thinkers of the time “sought to estab-
lish legal systems, based on scientific principles deduced from the nature of man
and things, that would guide individual behavior of metaphysical man in direc-
tions that would promote political order and assure a measure of protected indi-
vidual dignity.”  Calvin Woodard, Thoughts on the Interplay between Morality
and Law in Modern Legal Thought, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 784, 788 (1989).
Sovereigns of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, therefore, promulgated
legal codes “consisting of religious commandments, quasi-human moral values,
and civil virtues all couched in the language of legal proscriptions proclaimed and
enforced by sovereigns of secular states.” Id.  The mala in se/mala prohibita dis-
tinction fit well into this scheme of laws that were grounded in religion, yet
claimed authority from natural law. See id.
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judges played God, assigning blame for sin.220  The terms assume that
judges are “the prophet[s] to [whom] is revealed the state of morals of
the people or the common conscience.”221  Professor Herbert Weschler,
writing in 1930 on the distinction between mala in se and mala
prohibita, argued that the distinction invites judges into “a realm of
discourse in which courts are not to be trusted” and therefore, “[i]t is
time that the legal vocabulary renounce this vestige of the law’s eccle-
siastical heritage.”222
One might argue that judges do not have to rely on their own ideas
of morality to decide what is a CIMT, since judges can look to common
law to define which crimes are mala in se and therefore involve moral
turpitude.223  However, reference to common law offenses sheds no
additional light on the distinction between mala in se and mala
prohibita or on the meaning of moral turpitude.  Common law offenses
also were created by human beings, who merely attempted to rational-
ize them by reference to a higher authority.224  Also, the labels mala
in se and CIMT have come to incorporate offenses beyond the common
law crimes.225  As one judge wrote in 1930, “History discloses that all
offenses were at some time merely mala prohibita, and, as civilization
220. See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 236–27 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting);
see also In re Berk, 602 A.2d 946, 951 (Vt. 1991) (Morse, J., concurring) (stating,
in an attorney disciplinary proceeding for a crime involving moral turpitude,
“[t]he term is rooted in common law and was developed at a time when concepts
of religion and law were more closely interwoven and sin and crime were virtu-
ally synonymous . . . .  But, as society has increasingly become both more secular
and pluralistic, there is less consensus about what is immoral.”).
221. Bradway, supra note 153, at 22; see also Silver v. State, 79 S.E. 919, 921 (Ga.
1913) (“[W]e would hesitate to concur in the soundness of the view that the un-
lawful act . . . must be malum in se; for, outside of those things which are con-
demned as evil or wrong by the Holy Scriptures, the question of what would be
evil or wrong in its nature depends on individual conception and environment.”).
222. The Distinction Between Mala Prohibita and Mala in Se, supra note 211, at 86.
Professor John Bradway wrote that “[a]t one time the code of morals was in tangi-
ble form, consisting of the Bible, the Canon and Civil Law, and Aristotle.”  Brad-
way, supra note 153, at 21 n.43 (citing 2 W. S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 128 (1923)).  The Ecclesiastical Court was responsible for the moral
code’s enforcement. Id. at 21 n.43 (citing A. T. CARTER, A HISTORY OF THE EN-
GLISH COURTS 146 (5th ed. 1927)).  He wrote that “[i]n the latter part of the 19th
century ethical thought was influenced by Darwinian theories . . . [which] con-
flicted with that of the middle ages. Id.at 21 n.43 (citing 10 ENCYC. SOC. SCI
643–49 (1933)).
223. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 216, at *54–58 (citing common law offenses such as
murder, theft, and perjury as mala in se offenses).
224. Wolfe, supra note 217, at 137 (citing 6 W. S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 603 (1924)).
225. See LAFAVE, supra note 152, § 1.6(b), at 52 n.28 (“Perhaps . . . the ‘sense of a
civilized community’ may change somewhat in the course of time, so that a court
might find that conduct which constituted a common law crime is no longer ma-
lum in se although still prohibited by statute.”).
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advanced and social and moral ideals and standards changed, they
became one after another mala in se.”226
It is helpful to explore a few examples of the BIA and courts play-
ing God, applying what they deem to be society’s morals to new statu-
tory crimes to decide whether that offense involved moral turpitude.
Consider the example of domestic violence.  In 1993, the Ninth Circuit
held that spousal abuse was a CIMT,227 extending its prior holding
that child abuse was a crime involving moral turpitude to the domes-
tic abuse context.228  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that because spouses
are in a committed relationship of trust with the perpetrator, “spousal
abuse is an act of baseness or depravity contrary to accepted moral
standards,”229 whereas violence between strangers or acquaintances
did not necessarily contravene accepted moral standards.230  Ex-
tending the Ninth Circuit’s holding, the BIA held in 1996 that abuse
against a cohabitant was a CIMT.231  The BIA reasoned that
“[v]iolence between the parties of [a cohabitant] relationship is differ-
ent from that between strangers or acquaintances . . . [i]n our opinion,
infliction of bodily harm upon a person with whom one has such a
familial relationship is an act of depravity which is contrary to ac-
cepted moral standards.”232
Aggravated DUI is another offense where the BIA has defaulted to
“contemporary moral standards” to define it as a CIMT.  In a 1999
case, the BIA decided that an aggravated DUI offense, which required
the driver to commit a DUI knowing that he or she was prohibited
from driving under any circumstances, was a CIMT.233  The BIA in-
troduced its analysis by stating that moral turpitude is a “ ‘nebulous
concept’ with ample room for differing definitions of the term,”234 and
that “the nature of the crime is measured against contemporary moral
standards and may be susceptible to change based on the prevailing
226. State v. Malusky, 230 N.W. 735, 737 (N.D. 1930); see also Mei v. Ashcroft, 393
F.3d 737, 741 (7th Cir. 2004) (“In application . . . the distinction [between mala in
se and mala prohibita] turns out to be paper thin.”); LAFAVE, supra note 152,
§ 1.6(b), at 52 n.30 (“The trouble is that ‘moral turpitude’ is just as vague an
expression as ‘malum in se,’ so it helps very little to define one term by reference
to the other.”).
227. Gregeda v. INS, 12 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1993).
228. Guerrero de Nodahl v. INS, 407 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1969).  The Ninth Circuit
reasoned that “an adult is not as helpless of a victim as a child; nevertheless, a
spouse is committed to a relationship of trust with, and may be dependent upon,
the perpetrator.” Gregeda, 12 F.3d at 922.
229. Gregeda, 12 F.3d at 922.
230. See id.
231. See In re Phong Nguyen Tran, 21 I. & N. Dec. 291, 293–94 (B.I.A. 1996).
232. Id. at 294.
233. In re Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1188, 1196 (B.I.A. 1999).
234. Id. at 1191 (quoting Franklin v. INS, 72 F.3d 571, 573 (8th Cir. 1995) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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views in society.”235  The BIA reasoned that while simple DUI is a
mere regulatory offense and therefore not a CIMT, it is a “marginal
crime” that might involve moral turpitude,236 then stated, “when that
crime is committed by an individual who knows that he or she is pro-
hibited from driving, the offense becomes such a deviance from the
accepted rules of contemporary morality that it amounts to a crime
involving moral turpitude.”237
Failure to register as a sex offender is yet another example of the
BIA defaulting to the “contemporary moral standards” to define it as a
CIMT.  In 2007, the BIA held that a California failure to register as a
sex offender offense was a CIMT, thus rendering a noncitizen remova-
ble.238  The BIA introduced its analysis by observing that “the defini-
tion of a crime involving moral turpitude is nebulous,”239 and then
cited the usual definition of moral turpitude: “Moral turpitude refers
generally to conduct that is inherently base, vile, or depraved, and
contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed be-
tween persons or to society in general.”240  The BIA then stated,
“Under this standard, the nature of a crime is measured against con-
temporary moral standards and may be susceptible to change based
on the prevailing views in society.”241
These examples demonstrate that the term CIMT has no common
understanding, as the majority in Jordan suggested.242  The BIA is
constantly deciding issues of first impression, trying to “translate ethi-
cal concepts into legal ones, case by case.”243  But is the law now more
settled for noncitizens facing convictions for domestic violence, aggra-
vated DUI, and failure to register as a sex offender?  Not quite, as
evidenced by subsequent immigration case law on these very top-
ics.244  Moreover, there always will be new statutory offenses that
235. Id. at 1192.
236. Id. at 1196.  The BIA cited Jordan v. De George 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951) for the
notion that “there is inherent difficultly in determining whether marginal of-
fenses are crimes involving moral turpitude” and then stated, “[i]n our view, a
simple DUI offense is such a marginal crime.” Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dec. at
1196.
237. Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1196.  The BIA rejected the dissent’s argument
that the finding of moral turpitude in the case simply arose from an amalgama-
tion of distinct offenses, yet stated: “[R]ather, it results from a building together
of elements by which the criminalized conduct deviates further and further from
the private and social duties that persons owe to one another and to society in
general.” Id.
238. See In re Tobar-Lobo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 143, 145–46 (B.I.A. 2007).
239. Id. at 144.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 227 (1951).
243. See id. at 242 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
244. For example, three circuit courts have called into question the BIA’s holding in
Tobar-Lobo that failure to register as a sex offender is a CIMT; these courts cited
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states create in order to adapt to new criminal behavior.245  As these
offenses come before the BIA, it will sit in judgment of whether they
offend contemporary moral standards, leaving noncitizens without
fair notice of whether they will be subjected to deportation for a
CIMT.246
One might argue, however, that judges applying society’s morals to
the CIMT question is no different than an immigration judge deciding
whether a noncitizen merits discretionary relief from removal.  Immi-
gration law is full of what Professor Kanstroom describes as delegated
discretion;247 immigration judges are given discretion to decide
whether a noncitizen merits relief such as cancellation of removal,248
to both longstanding BIA precedent and the Attorney General’s subsequent hold-
ing in Silva-Trevino that scienter is essential to a finding of CIMT. See Pannu v.
Holder, 639 F.3d 1225, 1228–29 (9th Cir. 2011) (reasoning that Tobar-Lobo is
inconsistent with the subsequent holding in Silva-Trevino that scienter is essen-
tial to the finding of CIMT and remanding the case to the BIA); see also Totimeh
v. Att’y Gen., Nos. 10-3939, 11-1998, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 610, *14–17 (3d Cir.
Jan. 12, 2012) (reasoning that Tobar-Lobo is inconsistent with BIA precedent
that regulatory offenses are not CIMTs and holding that a predatory offender
registration is not categorically a CIMT); Efagene v. Holder, 642 F.3d 918,
921–22 (10th Cir. 2011) (reasoning that Tobar-Lobo is inconsistent with BIA pre-
cedent that regulatory offenses are not CIMTs and holding that failure to register
as a sex offender is not categorically a CIMT); In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec.
687, 706 (Att’y Gen. 2008).  In the domestic violence context, the BIA, ten years
after its holding in Tran, decided that a domestic violence offense punishing de
minimus force on the partner was not a CIMT. In re Sejas, 24 I. & N. Dec. 236,
238 (B.I.A. 2007).  In the aggravated DUI context, two years after its holding in
Lopez-Meza, the BIA held that an aggravated DUI offense that punished DUI
with two or more prior DUI convictions was not a CIMT. See In re Torres-Varela,
23 I. & N. Dec. 78, 86 (B.I.A. 2001).
245. See Albert Le´vitt, Extent and Function of the Doctrine of Mens Rea, 17 ILL. L.
REV. 578, 588 (1922) (“Social progress means that more acts are found to be
harmful to society and so are forbidden by statutory enactments.”).
246. Opinion Of Hon. Homer Cummings, Immigration Laws-Moral Turpitude-Politi-
cal Offense-Abnormal Conditions In Foreign Jurisdiction, 39 OP. ATTY GEN. 215,
221 (1938) (quoting Rudolph v. United States ex rel Rock, 6 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir.
1925) (“Many things which were not considered criminal in the past have, with
the advancement of civilization, been declared such by statute; and the commis-
sion of the offense, if it involves the violation of a rule of public policy and morals,
is such an act as may involve moral turpitude.”).
247. See Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and
Deference in U.S. Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 751–58 (1997).
248. Cancellation of removal is a discretionary waiver for long-term permanent re-
sidents who have been convicted of a removable offense.  A noncitizen must show
that he has been a lawful permanent resident for at least five years, has resided
continuously in the United States for at least seven years, and has not been con-
victed of an “aggravated felony.”  8 U.S.C. § 1229(b) (2006).  Once a noncitizen
has shown that he is eligible, the judge “may” grant him cancellation of removal;
the judge balances factors such as residence of long duration, hardship to the
noncitizen and his family, and genuine rehabilitation against the seriousness of
his criminal conviction. See id.; In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 11 (B.I.A. 1998).
Cancellation of removal is also available to non-permanent residents who have
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asylum,249 or adjustment of status.250  The Supreme Court has de-
scribed delegated discretion of the sort used in deciding relief from
removal as “unfettered.”251  The Court thus would “import no substan-
tive standards into this realm.”252  Delegated discretion decisions thus
are inherently unpredictable, leaving wise immigration lawyers to
suggest, “know your judge.”  Even those that apply a predictable set of
factors can have vastly different outcomes, as they often involve a bal-
ancing test of some sort.253
An immigration judge deciding whether an offense is a CIMT in-
volves interpretive as opposed to delegated discretion.254  However,
Interpretive discretion is the process by which the agency develops
meaning for immigration law terms such as CIMT.255  This type of
discretion should have a more law-like character, or at least be more
been continuously present in the U.S. for ten years, have good moral character,
are not removable for certain offenses, and for whom removal would result in
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” for a spouse, child, or parent who
is a U.S. citizen or permanent resident. See 8 U.S.C. §1229b(b)(1).  In addition,
battered spouses or children may seek cancellation of removal if the battery or
extreme cruelty was perpetrated by a spouse or parent who is or was a U.S. citi-
zen and the applicant has been physically present in the U.S. for three years, has
good moral character, is not removable for certain offenses, and can prove that
removal would result in extreme hardship to the applicant or the applicant’s child
or parent. Id. §1229b(b)(2).
249. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b).  An asylum applicant must prove that he is a “refugee,”
which means that he is outside of his country of origin and is unable or unwilling
to return due to a “well-founded fear or persecution on account of his race, relig-
ion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. Id.;
see id. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
250. Id. § 1225(a).  Adjustment of status is the means by which a noncitizen who is in
the U.S. seeks to obtain permanent residency.  Generally, an applicant must
show that he was inspected and admitted or paroled into the U.S., an immigrant
visa is immediately available to him, and that he is not subject to any of the
grounds of inadmissibility listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1182. See id. § 1255(a).
251. See Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 354 (1956).  In Jay, the petitioner was deportable
for being a member of the Communist Party and he applied for suspension of
removal under former 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a), which was a discretionary form of re-
lief. Id. at 348–49.  The special inquiry officer found that he met the statutory
prerequisites for the relief, but that he did not “ ‘warrant favorable action’ in view
of certain ‘confidential information;’” the Board of Immigration Appeals upheld
this determination. Id. at 349–50 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The peti-
tioner challenged a regulation that provided for the use of confidential informa-
tion in ruling on suspension applications if disclosure of the information would be
prejudicial to the public interest, safety, or security. Id.at 352.  The Court held
that the use of confidential information in a suspension hearing was properly
within the exercise of the agency’s discretion; the Court reasoned, “In view of the
gratuitous nature of the relief, the use of confidential information in a suspension
proceeding is . . . clearly within statutory authority.” Id. at 359, 361.
252. Kanstroom, supra note 247, at 756.
253. See, e.g., C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 11.
254. See Kanstroom, supra note 247, at 759–61.
255. Id. at 761.
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transparent, as it involves the agency setting guidance for future
cases.256  For this reason, most of the BIA’s interpretive discretion de-
cisions resemble a court engaging in statutory interpretation, examin-
ing, for example, the legislative history of a term or the term’s
longstanding use in immigration law.257  In the CIMT realm, how-
ever, the BIA can simply state that an offense, such as failure to regis-
ter as a sex offender, offends society’s morals and therefore is a CIMT;
this summary conclusion about society’s morals then governs future
cases.258  As Justice Jackson stated in his dissenting opinion in Jor-
dan, “Irrationality is inherent in the task of translating the religious
and ethical connotations of the phrase [CIMT] into legal decisions.”259
256. For this reason, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218
(2001), held that it would not accord deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat-
ural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), to an agency’s decision that
was the result of informal procedures, which are not binding on future parties.
Mead, 533 U.S. at 234.  The Court reasoned, “It is fair to assume generally that
Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it pro-
vides for a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fair-
ness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force.” Id. at
230; see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1450 (2005) (discussing the argument that
Chevron deference should be restricted “to the fruits of notice-and-comment
rulemaking or formal adjudication”); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA.
L. REV. 187, 223–25 (2006) (questioning the reasons why relatively formal proce-
dures are relevant in determining whether Chevron deference applies).
257. See, e.g., In re Alyazji, 25 I. & N. Dec. 397, 397, 404–05 (B.I.A. 2011) (interpreting
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A) (2006), which renders deportable a noncitizen for a con-
viction for one CIMT committed within five years of admission, and reaching a
conclusion of the meaning of “admission” in part by analyzing the legislative his-
tory of the terms “admission” and “entry”); In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 292,
294–99 (B.I.A. 2002) (deciding whether a noncitizen qualified for relief under Ar-
ticle 3 of the Convention Against Torture by parsing the legislative history and
other countries’ interpretations of the definition of “torture”).
258. See In re Tobar-Lobo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 143, 146 (B.I.A. 2007).
259. See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 239 (1951)  (Jackson, J., dissenting); see
also Marciano v. INS, 450 F.2d 1022, 1029 (8th Cir. 1971) (Eisele, J., dissenting)
(reasoning that it is difficult for administrators “to make continual determina-
tions of the nation’s shifting and often indistinct moral standards”); United
States ex. rel. Iorio v. Day, 34 F.2d 920, 921 (2d Cir. 1929) (“While we must not,
indeed, substitute our personal notions as the standard, it is impossible to decide
at all without some estimate, necessarily based on conjecture, as to what people
generally feel.”); State ex. rel. Mays v. Mason, 43 P. 651, 652 (Or. 1896) (“The
term [moral turpitude] lacks precision, and necessitates the examination of the
works of moral and ethical authors, rather than the textbooks of legal writers, to
ascertain whether a given case falls within or without the rule.” (quoting Skinner
v. White, 1 Dev. & Bat. 471 (1836))); What Constitutes a Crime Involving Moral
Turpitude, 23 A.L.R. FED. 480, § 1(a) (1975) (“The term ‘moral turpitude’ is prob-
ably incapable of precise definition in a legal sense, since it basically involves
moral or ethical judgments.”).
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2. Failing to Draw Meaning from CIMT in Other Areas of Law
Contrary to the reasoning of the majority in Jordan, the use of the
term CIMT in other areas of law does not give noncitizens any idea
what the term means.260  Courts and scholars alike have commented
that the term as used in other areas of law is uncertain, leading to
inconsistent results.261  As early as 1935, scholars critiqued the term
“CIMT” for its lack of a clear definition.262  Criticizing the term CIMT
as used in the context of attorney discipline, Professor John Bradway
recognized the need for a “catch-all” phrase such as CIMT in order to
“trip that old time professional villain now called ‘the lawyer-crimi-
260. See Jordan, 341 U.S. at 227.
261. See, e.g., Du Vall v. Bd. of Med. Exam’s, 66 P.2d 1026, 103 (Ariz. 1937) (consider-
ing whether to revoke a medical license because of a CIMT and reasoning that
“[t]he expression ‘moral turpitude’ is susceptible of more than one interpretation.
A crime might be held to involve moral turpitude, when gauged by the public
morals of one community, and in another community the same offense would not
be so considered.” (quoting In re Dampier, 267 P. 452, 454 (Idaho 1928))); In re
Jacoby, 57 N.E.2d 932, 936 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943) (considering whether to disci-
pline an attorney for a CIMT and reasoning that “[t]he question as to whether the
violation of a particular penal statute involved moral turpitude has principally
caused the diversity of decision”); In re Finch, 287 P. 677, 678 (Wash. 1930) (con-
sidering whether to disbar an attorney for a CIMT and reasoning that “[t]his
element of moral turpitude is necessarily adaptive; for it is itself defined by the
state of public morals, and thus far fits the action to be at all times accommo-
dated to the common sense of the community” (quoting Beck v. Stitzel, 21 Pa.
522, 524 (Pa. 1853))); see also State v. Malusky, 230 N.W. 735, 737 (N.D. 1930)
(considering whether a defendant had a prior CIMT to justify an enhanced sen-
tence and reasoning that “ ‘moral turpitude’ is a term which conforms to and is
consonant with the state of public morals; hence it can never remain stationary”
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab Co.,
111 A. 861, 863 (Conn. 1920))); Mays, 43 P. at 652 (considering whether an attor-
ney should be disbarred for a CIMT and reasoning that “ ‘moral turpitude’ is in-
volved only when so considered by the state of public morals, and hence it might
be applied in some sections and denied in others, thus rendering a satisfactory
definition of the term difficult if not impossible”); Crimes Involving Moral Turpi-
tude, supra note 162, at 119–20 (describing certain offenses that are sometimes
classified as crimes involving moral turpitude, depending on the jurisdiction,
stating: “Decisions dealing with violations of liquor statutes but demonstrate the
geographical variability of morals”).
262. See, e.g., Bradway, supra note 153, at 26–27 (“The term [CIMT] does not have
definite meaning in spite of judicial efforts to clarify it.  So far no one has found
the fundamental factor which will distinguish between those acts which do and
those which do not involve moral turpitude.  The search appears to breed as much
confusion as the original phrase.”); see also Donald T. Weckstein, Maintaining the
Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession, 48 TEX. L. REV. 267, 276 (1969)
(“Despite long and frequent use of the concept of ‘moral turpitude,’ it is both too
vague and too broad to be effectively employed as a standard for professional
discipline.”); Jay Wilson, The Definitional Problems with ‘Moral Turpitude,’ 16 J.
LEGAL PROF. 261, 262 (1991) (“What can be learned from the variety of definitions
is that moral turpitude means slightly different things to different judges.”).
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nal.’”263  However, despite the need for such flexibility, he argued the
judicial process of deciding what is a CIMT “is subject to the criticism
that a judge may unconsciously mistake his own bias for an intuitive
perception of the common conscience.”264  He wrote:
A judge applying the test of ‘moral turpitude’ is not merely expounding a prin-
ciple of law.  He is setting a moral standard, legislating perhaps, interpreting
the public mind.  Unless the legislature has supplied a precise definition the
judge of necessity makes an exploratory excursion into the field of morals.
This is not primarily a judicial function and the results all too often are in
conflict.265
At the time the Supreme Court decided Jordan, CIMT enjoyed
widespread use; laws governing the licensing of professionals, disbar-
ment of attorneys and the disqualification of witness testimony all em-
ployed the term.266  However, a closer examination of those areas of
law demonstrates that the term CIMT may be falling out of favor.267
In one notable example, the American Bar Association (ABA) rec-
ognized how unworkable the term CIMT was in the context of attor-
ney discipline.  In its 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility,
the DR-102(A) provided that “a lawyer shall not . . . engage in illegal
conduct involving moral turpitude.”268  When the ABA developed the
Model Rules of Professional Responsibility in 1983, the term CIMT
disappeared; replacing it was Rule 8.4, which states “it is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to . . . commit a criminal act that reflects ad-
versely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer
in other respects.”269  The comment to Rule 8.4 states that the concept
of moral turpitude “can be construed to include offenses concerning
some matters of personal morality, such as adultery and comparable
offenses, that have no specific connection to the fitness for the practice
of law.”270
263. Bradway, supra note 153, at 14 (internal quotation mark omitted).
264. Id. at 21.
265. Id.
266. See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 227 (1951).
267. For example, some states that previously allowed a witness to be impeached upon
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude have brought their rules of evi-
dence in line with Federal Rule of Evidence 609, which permits proof of conviction
for impeachment purposes if the elements of the witness’s prior offense required
dishonesty or false statements. See FED. R. EVID. 609; see also Debbie N. Whittle,
Evidence Law: Impeachment of Witnesses: Application of South Carolina Rule of
Evidence 608(b) and 609(a)(2), 49 S.C. L. REV. 1183 (1998) (discussing implemen-
tation of Rule 609 in South Carolina.); J. Walton Jackson, Commentary, Im-
peachment of a Witness by Prior Convictions Under the Alabama Rule of Evidence
609: Everything Remains the Same, or Does it?, 48 ALA. L. REV. 253 (1996)
(describing the implementation of Rule 609 in Alabama).
268. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(3) (1969).
269. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(b) (2011).
270. Id. R. 8.4 cmt.1.
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One scholar, discussing the term’s use in several state codes for
attorney discipline, even after the ABA had eliminated the term from
its Model Rules of Professional Conduct, described the term CIMT as
“conclusory but non-descriptive.”271  Arguing that “moral turpitude
means slightly different things to different judges,” he wrote: “It
seems appropriate to liken the test for ascertaining whether a crime
involves moral turpitude to Justice Stewart’s famous test for obscen-
ity—‘I know it when I see it’—set forth in his concurrence in Jacobellis
v. Ohio.”272
Thus, if Manuel and his public defender consult only BIA and fed-
eral immigration case law, they may be confused and at best can only
be certain if they come within the “easy” cases like fraud or theft.273  If
they consult case law on the meaning of CIMT from other contexts,
this sheds no additional light on the term.274  Nor do the BIA and
courts always follow the case law on the meaning of CIMT outside of
the immigration context.275  If anything, reviewing case law about the
meaning of CIMT in any one context shows that as society creates
more new offenses, courts must deal with whether those offenses are
CIMTs,276 leaving noncitizens to wonder which offenses are included
271. Wilson, supra note 262, at 262.
272. Id. (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
273. See Tseung Chu v. Cornell, 247 F.2d 929, 933 (9th Cir. 1957) (noting that the
“myriad [of] decisions sponsoring various concepts of moral turpitude” has not
offered any “well settled criteria”); Quilodran-Brau v. Holland, 232 F.2d 183, 184
(3d Cir. 1956) (“The borderline of ‘moral turpitude’ is not an easy one to locate.”).
274. See Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737, 740 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Had the parties broad-
ened their research to take in cases in which moral turpitude is found (or not
found) in criminal as distinct from immigration cases, they would have found a
couple of cases more nearly in point than any that either of them cites.  But un-
fortunately the cases point in opposite directions.  We are writing on a clean
slate.” (citations omitted)); see also Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 239 (1951)
(Jackson, J., dissenting) (“There have . . . been something like fifty cases in lower
courts which applied this phrase [CIMT].  No one can read this body of opinions
and feel that its application represents a satisfying, rational process.”); LAFAVE,
supra note 152, § 1.6(c), at 56 (stating that “the definition of the phrase ‘crimes
involving moral turpitude’ may depend somewhat on the setting in which the
phrase occurs”).
275. See, e.g., Cerezo v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1163, 1168–69 (2008) (when deciding
whether a California hit-and-run statute was a CIMT for purposes of deportation,
refusing to follow a California state court’s determination that the same statute
was a CIMT in evidence law).
276. For example, one scholar discussed the difficulty of determining whether viola-
tions of state prohibition laws following the passage of the Eighteenth Amend-
ment were CIMTs. See Note, Moral Turpitude and the Eighteenth Amendment,
17 IOWA L. REV. 76, 77–78 (1931).  He wrote that, when courts are attempting to
determine whether an offense involves moral turpitude, they must ascertain the
public conscience and he questions whether the passage of the Eighteenth
Amendment shows “that the people considered the act they prohibited by that
Amendment as involving moral turpitude.” Id. at 78; see also Note Moral Turpi-
tude and Its Connection with the Infraction of Liquor Laws, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 357,
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in the definition.  The BIA itself has conceded, “[s]ubsequent to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Jordan, both the courts and this Board
have referred to moral turpitude as a ‘nebulous concept’ with ample
room for differing definitions of the term.277  One district court
observed,
While the term ‘moral turpitude’ has been used in the law for centuries it has
never been clearly or certainly defined.  This is undoubtedly because it refers,
not to legal standards, but rather to those changing moral standards of con-
duct which society has set up for itself through the centuries.278
Thus, it does not appear that “passing years have by administrative
practice or judicial construction served to make [CIMT] clear as a
word of legal art.”279
3. Supreme Court Vagueness Challenges to Similar Statutes
The case law as developed in the Supreme Court both before and
after the Jordan decision support a finding that CIMT is void for
vagueness in the deportation context.  For example, statutory terms
such as CIMT have been held to be void for vagueness when the mean-
ing of a term changes from one generation to the next.280  The “moral
standards prevailing at the time” certainly changes from one genera-
tion to the next.281  The Supreme Court in Smith v. Goguen282 struck
down as void for vagueness a statute that punished defacing or treat-
ing contemptuously the flag of the United States;283 the Court rea-
soned, “because the display of the flag is so common and takes so
many forms, changing from one generation to another and often diffi-
cult to distinguish in principle, a legislature should define with some
care the flag behavior it intends to outlaw.”284  This concern for the
transient meaning of the statutory term is particularly salient in the
deportation context, because noncitizens come from many different
countries and thus cannot be assumed to have a common understand-
360 (1926) (“Since prohibition has been grafted onto the Constitution . . . courts
have more generally held that traffic in liquor shows an attitude in direct opposi-
tion to the expressed moral tone of the people.”).
277. In re Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1188, 1191 (B.I.A. 1999) (citing Franklin v. INS,
72 F.3d 571, 573 (8th Cir. 19951); In re Perez-Contreras, 20 I. & N. Dec. 615,
617–20 (B.I.A. 1992)).
278. United States ex rel. Manzella v. Zimmerman, 71 F. Supp. 534, 537 (E.D. Pa.
1947).
279. See Jordan, 341 U.S. at 238–39 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
280. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 616–17 (1974).
281. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 17, § 71.05(d)(i) (“Moral turpitude hardly can be
characterized as a precise and easily defined term.  Indeed, its flexibility appar-
ently evinces a design to accommodate the legislative command to changing
norms of behavior.”).
282. 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
283. See id. at 568–69 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 264 § 5 (Supp. 1973)).
284. See id. at 581–82.
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ing of the “moral standards generally prevailing” at any given time in
the U.S.285  In addition, it would be difficult for noncitizens to ascer-
tain the public morals when they can vary among communities.286
Statutory terms also have been voided for vagueness when, al-
though the statute uses a common term, i.e., “annoying,” the statute
does not indicate upon “whose sensitivity a violation . . . depend[s]—
the sensitivity of the judge or jury, the sensitivity of the arresting of-
ficer, or the sensitivity of a hypothetical reasonable man.”287  Moral
turpitude is not exactly a common term such as “annoying”; nor is it
clear whose morals a noncitizen must offend—the morals of the judge,
the arresting officer, or the hypothetical reasonable man.288  Rather,
the term CIMT relies on “wholly subjective judgments without statu-
tory definitions, narrowing context, or settled legal meanings.”289
While there are some settled legal meanings of CIMT in the immigra-
tion context, as described above, there are plenty of examples where
the settled case law does not help define the term.
There are several cases in which the Court has found to be vague
terms that sound very similar to CIMT or its oft-cited dictionary defi-
nition, “moral wickedness or depravity,”290 in that they call for subjec-
tive judgment and have no common understanding.  For example, in
Winters v. New York,291 the Court struck down as vague a state stat-
ute that, as interpreted by the state court, punished the publication or
distribution of publications of “criminal news or stories of deeds of
bloodshed, or lust, so massed as to become vehicles for inciting violent
and depraved crimes.”292  In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,293 the
285. The District Court of Pennsylvania, holding the term CIMT was void for vague-
ness in a statute that prohibited a student from receiving financial aid if he or
she had been convicted of a misdemeanor that Pennsylvania determined to be a
CIMT, stated: “If the state insists on legislating morality, we will insist at least
that it spell out is moral code, particularly when those affected by the statute are
of a different generation from the lawmakers and generally share a somewhat
different outlook on what is and is not moral.”  Corp. of Haverford Coll. v. Reeher,
329 F. Supp. 1196, 1206 (D. Pa. 1971).
286. See Skrmetta v. Coykendall, 16 F.2d 783, 784 (D. Ga. 1926) (“I realize that stan-
dards of morals differ from time to time and at different places, and moral turpi-
tude must necessarily be a somewhat loose expression.”); Weckstein, supra note
262, at 278 (arguing that the term CIMT is too vague to be a reason for attorney
discipline and stating, “A test like ‘prevailing moral standards’ varies too much
with time and place and judge”).
287. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 613 (1971).
288. See id.
289. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2720 (2010) (quoting
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 306 (2008)).
290. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 234 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (citing
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951)).
291. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
292. Id at 518.  The Court held that the statute, “even considering the gloss put upon
the literal meaning by the Court of Appeals,” was “too uncertain and indefinite to
justify the conviction of this petitioner.” Id. at 518–19.  The Court’s conclusion
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Court determined that a statute permitting the banning of motion pic-
tures on the ground that they are “sacrilegious” was vague,294 because
“the censor is set adrift upon a boundless sea amid a myriad of con-
flicting currents of religious views, with no charts but those provided
by the most vocal and powerful orthodoxies.”295  Following the reason-
ing in Joseph Burstyn, Inc., the Court, in per curium opinions, struck
down as vague the following film licensing standards: “immoral” or
“tending to corrupt public morals”296 and “cruel, obscene, indecent or
immoral, or such as tend to debase or corrupt public morals.”297  Also,
in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas,298 the Court voided for
vagueness a city ordinance that permitted censorship of films “not
suitable for young persons,”299 which included films “[d]escribing or
portraying . . . sexual promiscuity . . . in such a manner as to be, in the
judgment of the [Motion Picture Classification] Board, likely to incite
or encourage delinquency or sexual promiscuity on the part of young
persons or appeal to their prurient interest.”300  The Court reasoned
that such vague standards were problematic because “individual im-
pressions become the yardstick of action, and result in regulation in
accordance with the beliefs of the individual censor rather than regu-
lation by law.”301
rested on the lack of scienter required to be convicted under the statute, that the
clause had no common law or technical meaning, and that the clause did not gain
meaning from the section of the law in which it appeared. See id. at 519.
293. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
294. See id. at 497, 506.  The Court, having determined that “sacrilegious” was vague,
stated: “[I]t is not necessary for us to decide . . . whether a state may censor
motion pictures under a clearly drawn statute designed and applied to prevent
the showing of obscene films.” Id. at 505–06.
295. Id. at 504–05.
296. Superior Films, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 112 N.E.2d 311 (Ohio 1954), rev’d per
curiam, Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 346 U.S. 587 (1954).  In a com-
panion case, Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Education, 346 U.S. 587
(1954), the Court also struck down as void an ordinance that prohibited licensing
to films that were “harmful.” Id.
297. Holmby Prods., Inc., v. Vaughn, 282 P.2d 412 (Kans 1955), rev’d per curiam, 350
U.S. 870 (1955).
298. 390 U.S. 676 (1968).
299. Id. at 678, 690.
300. Id. at 681.
301. Id. at 685 (Clark, J., concurring) (quoting Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Re-
gents, 360 U.S. 684, 701 (1959)).  The Motion Picture Classification Board clari-
fied that films are “likely to incite or encourage crime delinquency or sexual
promiscuity on the part of young persons, if, in the judgment of the Board, there
is a substantial probability that it will create the impression on young persons
that such conduct is profitable, desirable, acceptable, respectable, praiseworthy
or commonly accepted.” Id. at 688.  However, the Court underscored how subjec-
tive this standard was, reasoning that “[w]hat may be to one viewer the glorifica-
tion of an idea as being ‘desirable, acceptable or proper’ may to the notions of
another be entirely devoid of such a teaching.” Id. (alteration in original) (quot-
ing Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp., 360 U.S. at 701).
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One can argue that these cases are not instructive on the issue of
whether CIMT is unconstitutionally vague in the deportation statute
because they involved films protected by the First Amendment, and
therefore “[p]recision of regulation must be the touchstone.”302  How-
ever, Professor Laurence Tribe has noted that “[d]iscussions of vague-
ness in first amendment cases often borrow ‘fair notice’ concepts from
vagueness challenges of other sorts,” even though “in the first amend-
ment area, the objectionable aspects of vagueness need not depend
upon the absence of fair notice.”303  While the Court has required
more specificity of a statute that potentially infringes on free speech
rights than in other contexts,304 “no doctrinal formulation of the re-
quired increment in specificity has seemed possible.”305  Thus, the
Court’s findings that terms such as “inciting violent or depraved
crimes,” “sacrilegious,” “immoral,” “tending to corrupt public morals,”
and “encouraging sexual promiscuity” are vague should be instructive
to courts determining whether CIMT can withstand a vagueness
attack.
Outside of the First Amendment context, the Court has considered
vagueness challenges to terms similar to CIMT.  For example, in Mus-
ser v. Utah,306 the Court considered a vagueness challenge to a Utah
criminal statute that punished persons for conspiring “to commit any
act injurious to the public health, to public morals, or to trade or com-
merce, or for the perversion or obstruction of justice or the due admin-
istration of laws.”307  Stating that “this is no narrowly drawn statute”
and that it was “admittedly very general,”308 the Court reasoned that
“it would seem to be warrant for conviction for agreement to do almost
any act which a judge and jury might find at the moment contrary to
his or its notion of what was good for health, morals, trade, commerce,
justice or order.”309  However, instead of voiding the statute for vague-
ness, the Court remanded the case to the Supreme Court of Utah to
determine whether there was a state court interpretation that limited
the reach of the statute.310  Interestingly, the majority opinion in Jor-
dan did not mention the Musser case, although it had just been de-
302. Id. at 682 (alteration in original) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438
(1963)).
303. TRIBE, supra note 175, § 12-31, at 1034.
304. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572–73 (1974).
305. TRIBE, supra note 175, § 12-31, at 1034.
306. 333 U.S. 95 (1948).
307. Id. at 96 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 103-11-1(5) (West 1943)).
308. Id. at 96, 97.
309. Id. at 97.
310. Id. at 97–98.
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cided by the Court and involved a vagueness challenge to a statute
with language similar to CIMT.311
There are other statutory phrases that seem just as vague as CIMT
and yet have withstood vagueness attacks because the Court has rea-
soned that they had a shared common understanding.  For example,
there is a “reasonableness” standard in negligence cases.312  In ob-
scenity cases, juries must decide, “applying contemporary community
standards,” whether the work “appeals to the prurient interest.”313
Yet, as Professor Robert Batey suggests, lurking beneath the surface
of these Court decisions upholding seemingly vague statutory terms is
the Court’s understanding of the necessity of such vague language to
uphold an important statutory purpose.314  As discussed below, the
311. See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 243 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(“Strangely enough, the Court does not even pay the tribute of a citation to its
recent decision in Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 68 S. Ct. 397, 92 L. Ed. 562, where
a majority joined in vacating and remanding a decision which had sustained con-
victions under the Utah statute which made criminal a conspiracy ‘to commit acts
injurious to public morals.’”).
312. In Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927), the Supreme Court struck down
a Colorado statute that prohibited combinations in restraint of trade except
where the purpose was “to obtain only a reasonable profit in such products or
merchandise as can not yield a reasonable profit except by marketing them under
the combinations previously condemned.” Id. at 456.  The Court rejected an argu-
ment that “reasonableness” was an acceptable standard in negligence cases, stat-
ing that in negligence cases, “[reasonableness] is a standard of human conduct
which all are reasonably charged with knowing and which must be enforced
against every one in order that society can safely exist.” Id. at 464-65.  Professor
Robert Post, discussing the holding in Cline, wrote, “judgments of reasonableness
. . . involve ‘common social duty,’ whereas judgments of reasonableness in the
area of market pricing transactions are vague because they have no ascertainable
referents.”  Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social
Orders, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 491, 500 (1994).
313. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S.
229, 230 (1972)).  The Supreme Court in Miller set forth a three-part test for
obscenity prosecutions:
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community stan-
dards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the pruri-
ent interest, (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id.  The Court has upheld this “contemporary community standards” test against
vagueness challenges. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 309 (1977) (up-
holding a federal statute that punished the mailing of obscene materials, as in-
terpreted by Miller, against a vagueness challenge); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 489, 491–92 (1957) (rejecting vagueness challenge to both state and
federal obscenity statutes, applying the test of “whether to the average person,
applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the mate-
rial taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest” and reasoning that this
language conveys sufficient definite warning as to the proscribed conduct).
314. See Batey, supra note 174, at 10–13 (discussing obscenity cases and stating that
the majority of the Supreme Court indicated a “desire to inflate the importance of
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statutory goals of the term CIMT, deporting undesirable noncitizens,
is a goal that can be achieved using more precise statutory terms.315
In the immigration context, the Court, in the 1924 case Mahler v.
Eby,316 rejected a vagueness challenge to a statute authorizing depor-
tation if a noncitizen was found to be an undesirable resident.317  Rea-
soning that “the expression ‘undesirable residents of the United
States’ is sufficiently definite to make the delegation quite within the
power of Congress.”318  The Court first noted that the longstanding
requirement for naturalization that a person be “of good moral charac-
ter, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States,
and well-disposed to the good order and happiness of the same” put
statutes banning obscene expression and thus to increase the force of the argu-
ment that some ambiguity in defining obscenity is necessary to achieve such an
important goal”).  In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), Justice
Brennan, in a dissenting opinion, reasoned that the Court’s various obscenity
tests are vague, but that the Court has defended them because “no one definition,
no matter how precisely or narrowly drawn, can possibly suffice for all situations,
or carve out fully suppressible expression from all media without also creating a
substantial risk of encroachment upon the guarantees of the Due Process Clause
and the First Amendment.” Id. at 83–87 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  He wrote,
“[A]s we have increasingly come to appreciate the vagueness of the concept of
obscenity, we have begun to recognize and articulate the state interests at stake.”
Id. at 105.  Thus, “the state interests in protecting children and in protecting
unconsenting adults may stand on a different footing from the other asserted
state interests.” Id. at 106.
315. See infra section IV.C.  The case of Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), also can
be interpreted through the lens of necessity.  In Parker, an army captain was
convicted of violating Article 133 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which
prohibits “conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.” Parker, 417 U.S. at
738 n.3 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 933 (2006)).  The Court upheld the statute, reason-
ing that Article 133 was defined by “the longstanding customs and usages of the
services,” which the army captain would know due to his membership in the mili-
tary. Id. at 748–49.  In a similar vein, the term “CIMT” has an arcane meaning,
which harks back to another time, when the “provision[ ] did not offend the sensi-
bilities of the federal judiciary in a wholly different period of our history.” Id. at
783 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also Jordan, 341 U.S. at 236–37 (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) (reasoning that the term mala in se, which is used to define CIMT,
“comes to us from the common law, which in its earliest history freely blended
religious conceptions of sin with legal conceptions of crime”).  Applying the rea-
soning of Parker, the term CIMT could withstand a modern vagueness challenge,
even though it rests on archaic notions of morality.  However, the holding in
Parker rested largely on the need for such ambiguity; because the Court reasoned
that the military needs “to maintain the discipline essential to perform its mis-
sion effectively,” such a vague term was constitutionally permissible. See Parker,
417 U.S. at 744; see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 n.8 (reasoning
that in Parker, the Court “deliberately applied a less stringent vagueness analy-
sis ‘[because] of the factors differentiating military society from civilian society’”
(quoting Parker, 417 U.S. at 756)).  In contrast, the term CIMT in immigration
law is not necessary to achieve statutory goals. See infra section IV.C.
316. 264 U.S. 32 (1924).
317. See id. at 39–41.
318. Id. at 40 (quoting Act of May 10, 1920, ch. 174, 41 Stat. 593).
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the term “undesirable resident” in context and indicated that history
had created a common understanding of the term.319  Next, the Court
pointed to another immigration law term, the “likely to become a pub-
lic charge” ground of exclusion, that is not “any more vague or uncer-
tain or any less defined,” yet had never been questioned for its
vagueness.320  Finally, the Court reasoned that because the statute
did not involve criminal penalties, “[t]he rule as to a definite standard
of action is not so strict in cases of the delegation of legislative power
to executive boards.”321
While the Mahler holding suggests that a vagueness challenge to
CIMT in a deportation statute should fail, the Court’s reasoning has
been called into question by subsequent changes in both immigration
law and the vagueness analysis.  While the phrases “good moral char-
acter” and “likely to become a public charge” still exist in immigration
law, Congress or the agency has since defined them by statute322 or
regulation.323  For example, the legislative history of the 1952 Act,
which defined “good moral character,” indicates that this term’s defi-
nition “provides standards as an aid for determining whether a person
is one of good moral character within the meaning of those provisions
of the bill.”324  Congress never bothered to create such standards for
the term CIMT. The Court also has rejected the notion that nearby
terms describing specific conduct can give meaning to vague statutory
terms.325  In addition, as discussed above, the Court has developed a
regard for deportation that makes it “quasi-criminal” in nature, thus
meriting a “relatively strict [vagueness] test.”326
The Supreme Court also has held that scienter can cure vague-
ness.327  In the immigration law context, the BIA and courts fre-
quently have held that a statute must have a mens rea of at least
recklessness to be a CIMT.328  Thus, it would seem that the scienter
requirement negates any vagueness challenge.  However, courts have
not unanimously concluded that a statute must have scienter in order
319. Id.
320. Id. at 40–41.
321. Id. at 41.
322. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (2006) (defining “good moral character”).
323. See 22 C.F.R. § 40.41 (2011) (defining steps intending immigrant must take in
order to overcome public charge ground of inadmissibility and defining “likely to
become a public charge” by reference to the federal poverty line).
324. S. REP. NO. 82-1137, at 6 (1952).  This report also states, “[b]y providing who
shall not be regarded as a person of good moral character, it is believed that a
greater degree of uniformity will be obtained in the application of the ‘good moral
character’ tests under the provisions of the bill.” Id.
325. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 569, 579 (1974).
326. See supra section IV.A.
327. See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 102 (1945).
328. See In re Fualaau, 21 I. & N. Dec. 475, 477–78 (B.I.A. 1996); In re Perez-Con-
treras, 20 I. & N. Dec. 615, 619 (B.I.A. 1992).
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to be a CIMT.329  Also, the case law requiring mens rea in order for a
statute to be a CIMT does not give any special notice that the offense
will later be a CIMT.  The term has no clear meaning and “[o]ne can-
not know or have an evil purpose to do what is unknowable.”330
C. Balancing Necessity Against Vagueness
The Court has recognized that no statutory language can be per-
fectly precise.331  Yet, when courts examine whether a statute is void
for vagueness, they often look to whether that statutory goal could be
achieved using more precise language.332  Professor Batey argues that
if a statute raises problems of fair notice or risk of arbitrary enforce-
ment, courts should engage in a balancing test, in which a judge bal-
ances the necessity of the ambiguity against the chilling effect of the
statute on protected or desirable conduct.333  A court should ask
whether the vague language is necessary to achieve some legislative
goal that cannot be achieved through more precise terms.334  This ra-
tionale is why common law crimes can withstand any vagueness chal-
lenges;335 it was critical for the makers of the common law crimes to
329. See, e.g., Castle v. INS, 541 F.2d 1064, 1066 (4th Cir. 1976); In re Tobar-Lobo, 24
I. & N. Dec. 143, 146 (B.I.A. 2007); In re Dingena, 11 I. & N. Dec. 723, 728 (B.I.A.
1966).
330. Collings, supra note 130, at 229.
331. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989) (“[P]erfect clar-
ity and precise guidance have never been required even of regulations that re-
strict expressive activity.”); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972)
(“Condemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty
from our language.”); Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340
(1952) (“But few words possess the precision of mathematical symbols, most stat-
utes must deal with untold and unforeseen variations in factual situations, and
the practical necessities of discharging the business of government inevitably
limit the specificity with which legislators can spell out prohibitions.”); Nash v.
United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913) (“[T]he law is full of instances where a
man’s fate depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently
estimates it, some matter of degree.”).
332. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 175, § 12-31, at 1034; Batey, supra note 174, at 30–31;
Jeffries, supra note 190, at 196; Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, supra note 130, at 95.
333. See Batey, supra note 174, at 9–26.
334. See id. at 9.  Batey cites as an example the cases of United States v. Petrillo, 332
U.S. 1 (1947), and Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974), in which the necessity of
the vague language ultimately prevailed over the concerns for notice and arbi-
trary and discriminatory enforcement.  Batey, supra note 174, at 9.
335. See Batey, supra note 174, at 12.  Professor Batey also notes that common law
crimes have meanings derived from centuries of case law; however, he argues
that “[a] more forthright explanation would focus on the significance of such
crimes to the very concept of criminal law and on the consequent necessity of the
vagueness in their statement.” Id.; see also Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 (1975)
(“[T]he phrase ‘crimes against nature’ is no more vague than many other terms
used to describe criminal offenses at common law and now codified in state and
federal penal codes.”).
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punish, for example, assaults, thefts, murder, and rape.336   Statutes
punishing new crimes, however, have had potentially vague terms
called into question.  This explains why legislation creating “new” (i.e.
not common law) crimes is more susceptible to a vagueness attack.337
When considering the validity of such statutes, the Court has engaged
in a discussion of the necessity of such laws.338
What did Congress intend to do when it authorized deportation for
a CIMT?  It appears that the legislative goal of the term CIMT was to
deport undesirable noncitizens from the U.S.,339 or at least deport
someone within five years of entry if he committed a serious crime.340
Is a vague term like CIMT necessary to achieve this legislative goal?
Today, the INA includes criminal grounds of deportation that are
much more clearly defined than CIMT.  For example, convictions of
crimes involving controlled substances and crimes involving firearms
336. See Batey, supra note 174, at 2; see also PETER W. LOW, CRIMINAL LAW 358–59
(rev. ed. 1990) (“No murder, theft, or rape statutes has ever been held unconstitu-
tionally vague, even though there is plenty of uncertainty in the phrases of the
common law that have traditionally been used to define these offenses.”).  Profes-
sor Batey states, “Few courts admit that in order to compute the necessity of
vague language, they must evaluate the significance of the legislative goal.”  Ba-
tey, supra note 174, at 10.  This is because balancing is “a baldly political assess-
ment, not one that judges (even elected ones) are expected to perform, which is
likely why judges are virtually silent about this aspect of the weighing necessity.”
Id.
337. See Batey, supra note 174, at 10–14; see also Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, supra note 130, at 84 (“ ‘Old’ common-law terms may have no
more illuminating clarity to the layman offender than the neologisms of Ronsard,
but they do present an effective means by which one bench of judges can super-
vise the law administration of another.”).
338. See Batey, supra note 174, at 10–15. (discussing case examples).  Whether neces-
sity actually can defend a vague statute, however, is a matter of dispute.  Andrew
Goldsmith has argued that the Court has rejected such a balancing of the neces-
sity of the statute against vagueness concerns in more recent cases. See Gold-
smith, supra note 171, at 308 (“[A]s weighty as [concern with criminal activity] is
. . . it cannot justify legislation that would otherwise fail to meet constitutional
standards for definiteness and clarity.” (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461, U.S.
352, 361 (1983))); see also Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676,
689–90 (1968) (rejecting the government’s defense of a vague statute that it was
adopted for the statutory purpose of protecting children); M. Kraus & Bros., Inc.
v. United States, 327 U.S. 614, 626 (1946) (“[C]ertainly a criminal conviction
ought not to rest upon an interpretation reached by the use of policy judgments
rather than by the inexorable command of relevant language.”).  Professor Batey,
however, discusses Kolender as an example of the Court finding that the stop-
and-identify statute was not important enough to outweigh the vagueness con-
cerns. See Batey, supra note 170, at 13–15.  Batey argues that although it would
be difficult to achieve the legislative goals of the statute at issue in Kolender with
more precision, the Court did not even suggest more precise language, which
“may reflect its disdain not so much for the legislature’s drafting ability as for its
decision to enact such a statute in the first place.” Id. at 14.
339. See supra section II.A.
340. See supra section II.A.
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or destructive devices are grounds of deportability;341 these grounds
reference other federal statutes for precise definitions of “controlled
substance,”342 “firearm,” and “destructive device.”343  In addition,
crimes involving domestic violence, stalking, child abuse, and viola-
tions of protection orders render noncitizens deportable.344  As one
court observed, “[t]he legislative history suggests that Congress added
these deportation grounds to close potential loopholes for aliens who
commit crimes against women and children that did not clearly fall
within other categories of deportable crimes such as CIMTs and ag-
gravated felonies.”345  Moreover, Congress clearly defined what it
meant by crimes of domestic violence346 and violations of protection
orders.347  And the death sentence in immigration law, the “aggra-
vated felony,” has a detailed definition in the INA, which includes
twenty-one categories of crimes.348  Thus, when Congress wanted to
clearly define ways that someone could be deported for undesirable
behavior, it knew how to do so.349 It appears that Congress’s concern
that “difficulties might be encountered in getting a phrase that would
be broad enough to cover the various crimes contemplated within the
341. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)–(C) (2006).
342. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (referencing 21 U.S.C. § 802 for definition of controlled
substance).
343. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(C) (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 921(a) for definitions of firearm and
destructive device).
344. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(E).
345. Arriaga v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 219, 225 at n.3 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing 142 CONG.
REC. S4058-02 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1996)).
346. Congress referenced the federal “crime of violence” statute, 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2006),
to define a crime of domestic violence for the purposes of deportation.  8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).
347. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii).  While Congress did not define “stalking” by ref-
erence to a federal statute, the Second Circuit, considering a vagueness challenge
to this ground of deportability, reasoned that at the time Congress authorized
deportation for stalking, there were several state statutes and a model federal
statute on stalking, which provided a generally accepted contemporary meaning
of the term. See Arriaga, 521 F.3d at 225–27.
348. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)–(U); see also Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path
of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64
WASH & LEE L. REV. 469, 484 (2007) (“In its nascent 1988 form, the aggravated
felony definition was defined narrowly, in keeping with [its] harsh consequences
. . . The term included only murder, weapons trafficking, and drug trafficking.  It
is now a colossus.”).
349. See Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, supra note 130, at 95
n.150 (“The ‘necessity’ of a particular mode of regulation will depend upon com-
parison with alternative modes—not limited to other possible verbal forms but
including also other possible enforcement methods.”); cf. United States v. Petrillo,
332 U.S. 1, 7 (1947) (“Clearer and more precise language might have been framed
by Congress to express what it meant by [the statutory term].  But none occurs to
us, nor has any better language been suggested, effectively to carry out what
appears to have been the Congressional purpose.”).
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law and yet easier to comprehend than [CIMT]”350 has been allevi-
ated.  So why does the term CIMT still linger in the INA?
One can argue that the term CIMT can easily adapt without legis-
lative involvement, so Congress wanted to keep such a fluid category
of removal in the INA.351  However, the term “aggravated felony” has
had no shortage of adaptation by courts without legislative involve-
ment.  The Supreme Court alone has ruled on the meaning of the term
aggravated felony on numerous occasions in the past decade.352  Nu-
merous courts of appeals also have adapted the meaning of the term
on various occasions.353  One also can argue that aggravated felony
does not ensnare all noncitizens who have committed crimes, as many
aggravated felony categories require, for example, a one-year term of
imprisonment.354  Thus, CIMT truly can be a “catch-all” category that
allows for deportation of criminal offenders.355  Yet, aggravated felony
catches quite a lot of noncitizens, as Congress has defined “term of
imprisonment” to include suspended sentences,356 thus ensnaring
many first-time offenders and persons convicted of misdemeanors.357
In some categories of offenses, the aggravated felony ground of de-
portability ensnares more noncitizens than CIMT.358
350. S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 353 (1950).
351. See Amy Wolper, Unconstitutional and Unnecessary: A Cost/Benefit Analysis of
“Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude” in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 31
CARDOZO L. REV. 1907, 1938 (2010).
352. See, e.g., Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577 (2010); Nijhawan v.
Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2294 (2009); Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007);
Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 (2006); Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004).
353. See, e.g., Berhe v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 74 (1st Cir. 2006); Soliman v. Gonzales, 419
F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2005); Nugent v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2004).
354. See, e.g., 8 USC § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2006) (conviction for a crime of violence with a
term of imprisonment of one year is an aggravated felony); id. § 1101(a)(43)(G)
(conviction for a theft offense with a term of imprisonment of one year is an ag-
gravated felony).
355. For example, in the case of Bejarano-Urrutia v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 444 (4th Cir.
2005), the offense at issue, involuntary manslaughter, would be a CIMT, even
though it was not an aggravated felony because the court held that the offense
was not a “crime of violence.” See id. at 446–47; see also In re Faulaau, 21 I. & N.
Dec. 475, 477–78 (B.I.A. 1996) (holding that statute punishing reckless conduct
resulting in serious bodily injury is a CIMT).
356. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B).
357. See, e.g., Guerrero-Perez v. INS, 242 F.3d 727, 737 (7th Cir. 2001) (“We . . . are
constrained to conclude that Congress, since it did not specifically articulate that
aggravated felonies cannot be misdemeanors, intended to have the term aggra-
vated felony apply to the broad range of crimes listed in the statute, even if these
include misdemeanors.”).
358. Compare In re V-Z-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1338, 1345–46 (B.I.A. 2000) (holding that a
statute punishing theft with intent to temporarily or permanently deprive the
owner of the rights and benefits of ownership is a theft offense aggravated felony
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G)), with In re D-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 143, 144–45
(B.I.A. 1941) (holding that theft with intent to steal is a CIMT, whereas theft
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Additionally, the term aggravated felony already largely encom-
passes the “easy” CIMT cases359: fraud, theft, aggravated assaults,
and many sexual offenses are likely to be classified as aggravated felo-
nies, if the term of imprisonment or loss to the victim also meets the
statutory requirement.360  Because those who are sufficiently certain
about their deportation for a CIMT also are likely to face deportation
for an aggravated felony, either way, the law achieves the goal of de-
porting the undesirable noncitizen.  The only legislative accomplish-
ment of the term CIMT is to violate the due process rights of those
noncitizens whose offenses are not clearly defined as CIMTs by case
law.
If courts void the statute authorizing deportation for a CIMT, Con-
gress loses some flexibility.  However, Congress has the ability to
amend the INA to add new criminal grounds of deportability as new
crimes plague society.  Indeed, this is exactly what Congress did in
1996 when it added stalking, domestic violence, and crimes against
children to the grounds of deportability.361  Thus, as new crimes arise,
Congress can amend the INA, using clear terms, rather than allowing
the BIA and courts to determine whether each new crime offends soci-
ety’s morals.
V. CONCLUSION
The term CIMT has long outlived its usefulness in deportation law.
Its parameters are uncertain, with the exception of a few categories of
crimes such as fraud, the offense at issue when the Supreme Court
last heard a vagueness challenge to the term in its 1951 Jordan deci-
sion.  Its “clarifying” definition, an act that is “base, vile, depraved, or
contrary to the rules of morality” gives no more clarification of the
term.  Rather, the term CIMT casts judges in the role of God, deciding
according to the “moral standards generally prevailing in the United
States,” whether a certain offense involves moral turpitude.  This al-
lows neither noncitizens nor their criminal defense attorneys to pre-
dict which offenses will lead to deportation for a CIMT.  Nor does
resorting to the term’s use in other areas of law clear up its uncer-
tainty.  It is time for courts to seriously consider a vagueness chal-
lenge to the term CIMT in deportation law.  As Judge Posner has
with intent to deprive the owner of his rights for a temporary period is not a
CIMT).
359. See Wolper, supra note 351, at 1939.
360. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), (G), (M).
361. See Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 350, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-639 to -640 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(E) (2006)).
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stated, “[t]ime has only confirmed Justice Jackson’s powerful dissent
in the [Jordan] case, in which he called ‘moral turpitude’ an ‘unde-
fined and undefinable standard.’”362
362. Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737, 741 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jordan v. De George,
341 U.S. 223, 235 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
